IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/envira/v35y2003i8p1431-1458.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Blockholdings 1997–2001

Author

Listed:
  • Dariusz Wójcik

    (School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3TB, England)

Abstract

In order to research the dynamics of the German model of corporate governance, data pertaining to major holdings of voting rights in listed companies between 1997 and 2001 were examined. The change that took place in this short period of time is striking, with a falling level of ownership concentration, dissolving cross-holdings, and financial sector institutions losing their position as blockholders. The concentration of voting rights is lowest in companies included in the DAX30 stock-market index. Factors affecting the types of holders of voting rights in a company include the company size, age, economic sector, and location. The analysis shows that Germany made a quick step towards some aspects of the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. However, there are also areas of strong persistence of the German model. In addition, I show that the German model is far from uniform, with different types of companies and different regions demonstrating a variety of corporate governance arrangements as well as distinctive development trajectories.

Suggested Citation

  • Dariusz Wójcik, 2003. "Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Blockholdings 1997–2001," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 35(8), pages 1431-1458, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:35:y:2003:i:8:p:1431-1458
    DOI: 10.1068/a35162
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1068/a35162
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1068/a35162?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barca, Fabrizio & Becht, Marco (ed.), 2001. "The Control of Corporate Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247424.
    2. Becht, Marco, 1999. "European corporate governance: Trading off liquidity against control," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1071-1083, April.
    3. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58, January.
    4. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 265, OECD Publishing.
    5. Jenkinson, Tim & Ljungqvist, Alexander, 2001. "The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 397-446, December.
    6. Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 1999. "Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 2045-2073, December.
    7. Rolf Sternberg & Christine Tamasy, 1999. "Munich as Germany's No. 1 High Technology Region: Empirical Evidence, Theoretical Explanations and the Role of Small Firm/Large Firm Relationships," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 367-377.
    8. Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, 2002. "Corporate control in Europe," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(4), pages 471-498.
    9. Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, 2001. "How Distance, Language, and Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1053-1073, June.
    10. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    11. Jonathan Story & Ingo Walter, 1997. "Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692031, December.
    12. Dore, Ronald, 2000. "Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199240616.
    13. Wolfgang Bernhardt, 2000. "Acquisitions, Mergers and Cancellations in Germany – in the white water of shareholder value," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 327-334, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dariusz Wojcik, 2002. "The La¨nder are the Building Blocks of the German Capital Market," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(8), pages 877-895.
    2. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    3. Marc Goergen & Miguel Manjon & Luc Renneboog, 2008. "Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(1), pages 37-71, March.
    4. Weber, Anke, 2009. "An empirical analysis of the 2000 corporate tax reform in Germany: Effects on ownership and control in listed companies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 57-66, March.
    5. Ettore Croci, 2007. "Corporate Raiders, Performance and Governance in Europe," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 13(5), pages 949-978, November.
    6. Oxelheim, Lars & Randoy, Trond, 2003. "The impact of foreign board membership on firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 2369-2392, December.
    7. Peter Cziraki & Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, 2010. "Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(5), pages 738-777, November.
    8. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
    9. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2003. "Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the UK," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe15, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    10. Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2005. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," NBER Working Papers 11368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Takeover Waves : Triggers, Performance and Motives," Discussion Paper 2005-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    13. Pombo, Carlos & Gutiérrez, Luis H., 2007. "Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Colombia," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1608, Inter-American Development Bank.
    14. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    15. Vitols, Sigurt, 2003. "Negotiated shareholder value: The German version of an Anglo-American practice," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions, States, Markets SP II 2003-25, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    16. Gordon L Clark & Dariusz Wójcik, 2005. "Path Dependence and Financial Markets: The Economic Geography of the German Model, 1997–2003," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 37(10), pages 1769-1791, October.
    17. Khachaturyan, Arman, 2006. "The One-Share-One-Vote Controversy in the EU," ECMI Papers 1203, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    18. Pertti Haaparanta & Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva & Jukka Pirttila & Laura Solanko & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Firms And Public Service Provision In Russia," Working Papers w0041, New Economic School (NES).
    19. Manjon, M.C., 2003. "The Trade-Off Between Risk and Control in Corporate Ownership," Discussion Paper 2003-81, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    20. Sudi Sudarsanam & Tim Broadhurst, 2012. "Corporate governance convergence in Germany through shareholder activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 235-268, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:35:y:2003:i:8:p:1431-1458. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.