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Voluntary Sovereign Debt Exchanges

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  • Juan Carlos Hatchondo
  • Leonardo Martinez
  • Cesar Sosa Padilla

Abstract

We show that some recent sovereign debt restructurings were characterized by (i) the absence of missed debt payments prior to the restructurings, (ii) reductions in the government’s debt burden, and (iii) increases in the market value of debt claims for holders of the restructured debt. Since both the government and its creditors are likely to benefit from such restructurings, we label these episodes as “voluntary” debt exchanges. We present a model in which voluntary debt exchanges can occur in equilibrium when the debt level takes values above the one that maximizes the market value of debt claims. In contrast to previous studies on debt overhang, in our model opportunities for voluntary exchanges arise because a debt reduction implies a decline of sovereign default risk. This is observed in the absence of any effect of debt reductions on future output levels. Although voluntary exchanges are Pareto improving at the time of the restructuring, we show that eliminating the possibility of conducting voluntary exchanges may improve welfare from an ex-ante perspective. Thus, our results highlight a cost of initiatives that facilitate debt restructurings.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Cesar Sosa Padilla, 2013. "Voluntary Sovereign Debt Exchanges," Department of Economics Working Papers 2013-13, McMaster University.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2013-13
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Jiseob & Wang, Yicheng, 2018. "Macroeconomic and distributional effects of mortgage guarantee programs for the poor," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 124-151.
    2. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 1781-1823.
    3. Kim, Jiseob, 2019. "How foreclosure delays impact mortgage defaults and mortgage modifications," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 18-37.
    4. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.),Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    5. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & César Sosa-Padilla, 2016. "Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1383-1422.
    6. Victor Leão Borges de Almeida & Carlos Esquivel & Juan Pablo Nicolini & Timothy Kehoe, 2018. "Did the 1980s in Latin America Need to Be a Lost Decade?," 2018 Meeting Papers 829, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Prein, Timm, 2019. "Persistent Unemployment, Sovereign Debt Crises, and the Impact of Haircuts," Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203654, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Tamon Asonuma & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive Or Post-Default," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 175-214, February.
    9. Maximiliano Dvorkin & Emircan Yurdagul & Horacio Sapriza & Juan Sanchez, 2018. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Dynamic Discrete Choice Approach," 2018 Meeting Papers 1273, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Trebesch, Christoph & Zabel, Michael, 2017. "The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 416-432.
    11. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch, 2012. "Fiscal rules and the sovereign default premium," Working Paper 12-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, revised 2012.
    12. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Trebesch, Christoph, 2014. "A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default, and Relief," Discussion Papers in Economics 21832, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    13. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo & Onder, Yasin Kursat, 2017. "Non-defaultable debt and sovereign risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 217-229.
    14. Juliana Salomao, 2015. "Sovereign Debt Renegotiation and Credit Default Swaps," 2015 Meeting Papers 826, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Francois R. Velde, 2016. "What We Learn from a Sovereign Debt Restructuring in France in 1721," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue 5, pages 1-17.
    16. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "Sovereign Debt Relief and Its Aftermath," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 215-251.
    17. Leonardo Martinez & Juan Hatchondo, 2017. "Sovereign Cocos and the Reprofiling of Debt Payments," 2017 Meeting Papers 1435, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Maximiliano Dvorkin & Juan M. Sanchez & Horacio Sapriza & Emircan Yurdagul, 2018. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings," Working Papers 2018-13, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 27 Feb 2019.
    19. Luo, Jie & Wang, Cheng, 2018. "Optimal sovereign lending and default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 190-213.
    20. Salomao, Juliana, 2017. "Sovereign debt renegotiation and credit default swaps," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 50-63.
    21. Sunder-Plassmann, Laura, 2018. "Writing off sovereign debt: Default and recovery rates over the cycle," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 221-241.
    22. Grey Gordon, 2019. "Efficient Computation with Taste Shocks," Working Paper 19-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, revised 11 Sep 2019.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign Default; Debt Restructuring; Voluntary Debt Exchanges; Long-term Debt; Endogenous Borrowing Constraints.;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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