IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Unproductive Education in a Model of Corruption and Growth

  • M. Emranul Haque
Registered author(s):

    This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of education, public sector corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government intervention along with physical and human capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are responsible for procuring public goods, which contribute to productive efficiency. Corruption arises because of an opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds. Education has two opposing effects, a positive productivity enhancing effect and a negative corruption efficiency of bureaucrats. If the latter dominates the former, the incentive for bureaucrats to acquire education rises. The net effect may result in an insignificant (or even negative) effect of human capital on growth. Our results are straightforward. First, corruption and development are determined jointly in a relationship that is two-way causal: bureaucratic malfeasance both influences and is influenced by economic activity and human capital accumulation. Second, this two-way causality gives rise to threshold effects and multiple development regimes with very different equilibrium properties: in low stages of development there is a unique equilibrium with high corruption where higher human capital cannot get the economy out of poverty trap, in high stages of development there is a unique equilibrium with low corruption where human capital can exert its influence, and in intermediate stages of development there are both types of equilibrium. Third, transition between regimes may or may not be feasible and it is possible for a development trap to occur.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/cgbcr/discussionpapers/dpcgbcr178.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester in its series Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series with number 178.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:178
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Manchester M13 9PL
    Phone: (0)161 275 4868
    Fax: (0)161 275 4812
    Web page: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/subjects/economics/our-research/centre-for-growth-and-business-cycle-research/

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Theo Eicher & Cecilia García-Peñalosa & Tanguy Ypersele, 2009. "Education, corruption, and the distribution of income," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 205-231, September.
    2. Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2006. "Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2006 8, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:178. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marianne Sensier)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.