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Management Compensation and the Economic Crisis: Longitudinal Evidence from the German Chemical Sector

Author

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  • Grund, Christian

    (RWTH Aachen University)

  • Walter, Tanja

    (RWTH Aachen University)

Abstract

Making use of unique balanced panel data for the German chemical sector from the years 2008 to 2011, we explore the extent to which managers' compensation was affected by the economic crisis and the extent to which it increased afterwards. Carrying out longitudinal analyses, we find that, on average, bonus payments (in contrast to fixed salaries) decrease considerably during the crisis. The economic upturn in 2011 then leads to an average increase in variable payments and total compensation to even above the pre-crisis level. Changes in bonus payments are negatively correlated over time. We find considerable differences across employees with respect to changes in bonus payments. Fixed salary changes are much more homogeneous over the period of crisis. We explore determinants of compensation changes and find that changes in compensation have a strong relationship with employees' age, firm size and hierarchical level. Our findings hint at the relevance of an incentive perspective. We also examine that certain parts of managers seem to have more power to influence their compensation than others. Inequality in managers' compensation decreased during the crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Grund, Christian & Walter, Tanja, 2013. "Management Compensation and the Economic Crisis: Longitudinal Evidence from the German Chemical Sector," IZA Discussion Papers 7435, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7435
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    2. Matović Ivana Marinović, 2019. "Comparative Analysis of Executive Compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU Countries," Economic Themes, Sciendo, vol. 57(2), pages 181-200, June.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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