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Employee Ownership and Promotive Voice: The Roles of Psychological Ownership and Perceived Alignment of Interests

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Listed:
  • Cooper, Dylan A.

    (California State University, Channel Islands)

  • Fang, Tony

    (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

  • Wan, Vincent

    (Shandong University)

Abstract

Using a National Bureau of Economic Research dataset of employees of 14 United States companies with shared capitalism practices, we compare two prominent explanations of employee ownership’s influence on pro-organizational behaviors—psychological ownership and alignment of financial interests—by testing the effects of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and current profit sharing on promotive voice. We conducted a path-analysis of a moderated multiple-mediation regression model using the PROCESS macro. Our sample included 16,557 participants. We find that psychological ownership partially transmits the effects of ESOP participation and current profit sharing on promotive voice. Employee decision influence strengthens the relationship between ESOP participation and psychological ownership. Perceived alignment of interests does not mediate the relationships between employee ownership and promotive voice.

Suggested Citation

  • Cooper, Dylan A. & Fang, Tony & Wan, Vincent, 2025. "Employee Ownership and Promotive Voice: The Roles of Psychological Ownership and Perceived Alignment of Interests," IZA Discussion Papers 18023, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy

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