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Nudging Businesses to Pay Their Taxes: Does Timing Matter?

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  • Gillitzer, Christian

    (University of Sydney)

  • Sinning, Mathias

    (Australian National University)

Abstract

This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence on the implications of the timing of reminders by studying the effect of varying the timing of reminder letters to taxpayers on their payment behavior. The collection of unpaid tax debts constitutes a considerable challenge for tax authorities. We show that varying the timing of a reminder letter has a theoretically ambiguous effect on tax payments. We study the payment behavior of business taxpayers in a field experiment in Australia and find that a simple reminder letter increases the probability of payment by about 25 percentage points relative to a control group that does not receive a letter from the tax authority. However, variation over a three-week period in the timing of the reminder letter has no effect on the probability of payment within seven weeks of the due date. Our findings indicate that sending reminders early results in faster payment of debts with no effect on the ultimate probability of payment.

Suggested Citation

  • Gillitzer, Christian & Sinning, Mathias, 2018. "Nudging Businesses to Pay Their Taxes: Does Timing Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 11599, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11599
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    Cited by:

    1. Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh & Dai, Zhixin & Wang, Kezhi, 2021. "Does the frequency of reminders matter for their effectiveness? A randomized controlled trial," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 752-764.
    2. Fels, Katja M., 2021. "Who nudges whom? Field experiments with public partners," Ruhr Economic Papers 906, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Eko Arief Yogama & Daniel J. Gray & Matthew D. Rablen, 2023. "Nudging for Prompt Tax Penalty Payment: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," Working Papers 2023023, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
    4. Sinning, Mathias & Zhang, Yinjunjie, 2023. "Social norms or enforcement? A natural field experiment to improve traffic and parking fine compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 43-60.
    5. Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2019. "Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Monica Mogollon & Daniel Ortega & Carlos Scartascini, 2021. "Who’s calling? The effect of phone calls and personal interaction on tax compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(6), pages 1302-1328, December.
    7. C. Yiwei Zhang & Jeffrey Hemmeter & Judd B. Kessler & Robert D. Metcalfe & Robert Weathers, 2023. "Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the U.S. Supplemental Security Income Program," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 1341-1353, March.
    8. Netta Barak‐Corren & Yael Kariv‐Teitelbaum, 2021. "Behavioral responsive regulation: Bringing together responsive regulation and behavioral public policy," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 163-182, November.
    9. Minou Ghaffari & Maxime Kaniewicz & Stephan Stricker, 2021. "Personalized Communication Strategies: Towards A New Debtor Typology Framework," Papers 2106.01952, arXiv.org.
    10. Deetlefs, A.M. Jeanette & Chalmers, Jenny & Tindall, Karen & Wiryakusuma-McLeod, Cindy & Bennett, Sue & Hay, Iain & Humphries, Jacqueline & Eady, Michelle J. & Cronin, Lynette & Rudd, Karl, 2021. "Applying behavioral insights to increase rural and remote internships: Results from two Randomized Controlled Trials," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    11. Dean Franklet & Laura Meriluoto & George Ross & Cameron Scott & Patrick Williams, 2018. "Public implementation of Blockchain Technology," Working Papers in Economics 18/23, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax compliance; business taxation; natural field experiment; behavioral insights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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