Cooperation and Authoritarian Values: An experimental study in China
There is ample evidence of a ''democracy premium''. Using field data and laboratory experiments, it has been observed that democratic governance leads to more cooperative behavior compared to a non-democratic approach. We present evidence from Chinese students and workers who participated in public goods experiments and a value survey. We find a premium for top-down rule implementation arguably stemming from people with stronger individual values for obeying authorities. When participants have higher values for obeying authorities, they even conform to unfavorable rules. Our findings provide evidence that the effectiveness of a political institution depends on its congruence with individual values and societal norms.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2013|
|Date of revision:||Jun 2015|
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