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Cooperation and Authoritarian Values: An experimental study in China

Author

Listed:
  • Bj�rn Vollan

    ()

  • Yexin Zhou

    ()

  • Andreas Landmann

    ()

  • Biliang Hu

    ()

  • Carsten Herrmann-Pillath

    ()

Abstract

There is ample evidence of a ''democracy premium''. Using field data and laboratory experiments, it has been observed that democratic governance leads to more cooperative behavior compared to a non-democratic approach. We present evidence from Chinese students and workers who participated in public goods experiments and a value survey. We find a premium for top-down rule implementation arguably stemming from people with stronger individual values for obeying authorities. When participants have higher values for obeying authorities, they even conform to unfavorable rules. Our findings provide evidence that the effectiveness of a political institution depends on its congruence with individual values and societal norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Bj�rn Vollan & Yexin Zhou & Andreas Landmann & Biliang Hu & Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2013. "Cooperation and Authoritarian Values: An experimental study in China," Working Papers 2013-14, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, revised Jun 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-14
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    Cited by:

    1. H. Sun & M. Bigoni, 2015. "A Fine Rule From a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust," Working Papers wp1031, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    2. repec:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:348-367 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:eee:ecolec:v:150:y:2018:i:c:p:62-71 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Gallier, Carlo, 2017. "Democracy and compliance in public goods games," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-038, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    5. Gallier, Carlo, 2018. "Democracy and compliance in public goods games," Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181620, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    legitimacy of legal sanctions; authoritarian values; democratic voting; public goods; China;

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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