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Cooperation and Authoritarian Values: An experimental study in China

Author

Listed:
  • Björn Vollan
  • Yexin Zhou
  • Andreas Landmann
  • Biliang Hu
  • Carsten Herrmann-Pillath

Abstract

There is ample evidence of a ''democracy premium''. Using field data and laboratory experiments, it has been observed that democratic governance leads to more cooperative behavior compared to a non-democratic approach. We present evidence from Chinese students and workers who participated in public goods experiments and a value survey. We find a premium for top-down rule implementation arguably stemming from people with stronger individual values for obeying authorities. When participants have higher values for obeying authorities, they even conform to unfavorable rules. Our findings provide evidence that the effectiveness of a political institution depends on its congruence with individual values and societal norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Björn Vollan & Yexin Zhou & Andreas Landmann & Biliang Hu & Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2013. "Cooperation and Authoritarian Values: An experimental study in China," Working Papers 2013-14, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, revised Jun 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-14
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    legitimacy of legal sanctions; authoritarian values; democratic voting; public goods; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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