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Auftragsvergabe, Leistungsqualitaet und Kostenintensitaet im Schienenpersonenverkehr. Eine internationale Perspektive

Author

Listed:
  • Matthias Aistleitner

    (Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria)

  • Christian Grimm

    (Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria)

  • Jakob Kapeller

    () (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria)

Abstract

Vor dem Hintergrund der fortdauernden Diskussion zu adaequaten Formen der Auftragsvergabe im Schienenpersonenverkehr, untersucht die vorliegende Studie den Zusammenhang zwischen der Form der Auftragsvergabe und dem Umfang, den Kosten sowie der Qualitaet oeffentlicher Verkehrsdienstleistungen. Eine solche Analyse traegt insofern zu aktuellen Debatten der Verkehrspolitik bei, als zur Zeit kein systematischer, internationaler Vergleich zur Frage dieses Zusammenhangs im Schienenpersonenverkehr vorliegt. Ein solcher Vergleich soll dabei helfen, die Effektivitaet und Brauchbarkeit unterschiedlicher Vergabemodi in Europa sowie ihre Folgen auf die Entwicklung des oeffentlich finanzierten Personenverkehrs besser abschaetzen zu koennen. Zu diesem Zweck werden im Rahmen der Studie aktuell relevante theoretische und empirische Beitraege ueberblicksartig diskutiert. Ein wesentliches Resuemee dieser Zusammenschau zur aktuellen wissenschaftlichen Literatur ist dabei, dass zu den Folgen einer staerkeren Markt- und Wettbewerbsorientierung im Rahmen der Auftragsvergabe weder eindeutige theoretische Argumente noch schlagende empirische Befunde vorliegen. Vielmehr ist die zeitgenoessische Literatur durch sich widersprechende theoretische und empirische Argumente gekennzeichnet, die keine eindeutigen Schluesse hinsichtlich den Auswirkungen einer erhoehten Marktorientierung zulassen. Um zur Schliessung dieser Forschungsluecke beizutragen entwickelt die vorliegende Studie abschliessend einen eigenen empirischen Ansatz um die Folgen und Effekte einer staerkeren Marktorientierung im internationalen Vergleich und mit quantitativen Methoden zu untersuchen. Zu diesem Zwecke wurden Daten unterschiedlicher Quellen kombiniert um inhaerente und teils drastische Limitationen in bestehenden Datenbestaenden zumindest teilweise zu kompensieren. Die Ergebnisse der hieraus resultierenden statistischen Analysen zeigen, dass eine groessere Markt- und Wettbewerbsorientierung im internationalen Mittel in einem negativen Zusammenhang mit dem erbrachten Leistungsvolumen und der damit verbundenen Leistungsqualitaet steht. Diese Schaetzergebnisse sind dabei zwar statistisch signifikant, zeigen aber nur geringe Effektgroessen - in Umstand, der als Indiz dafuer verstanden werden kann, dass der Grad der Markt- und Wettbewerbsorientierung in der Auftragsvergabe fuer die effektive Performance des Eisenbahnwesens nur von nachrangiger Bedeutung ist. Darueber hinaus legen die in dieser Studie praesentierten Ergebnisse nahe, dass eine groessere Marktorientierung im Eisenbahnsektor nicht notwendigerweise zu einer Reduktion der Aufwendungen der oeffentlichen Hand fuehrt. In Kombination mit den Ergebnissen des Literaturueberblicks muss vielmehr angenommen werden, dass die Determinanten eines effizienten und leistungsfaehigen Eisenbahnwesens weniger in der jeweils gewaehlten Vergabeform als in der kontextadaequaten und professionellen Umsetzung dieser jeweiligen Vergabeformen zu finden sind. Insofern bieten diese Ergebnisse Anlass, bestehende Reformbemuehungen in Europa, die auf eine Staerkung der Marktorientierung im Eisenbahnwesen abzielen, kritisch zu reflektieren, obgleich die vorliegenden Ergebnisse sicher nicht als abschliessend bezeichnet werden koennen: Weiterfuehrende Analysen scheinen fuer eine abschliessende Beurteilung dabei mindestens ebenso notwendig wie eine (massive) Verbesserung der verfuegbaren Datenbestaende deren grundlegende Limitationen auch in der vorliegenden Arbeit nur teilweise ueberwunden werden koennen.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Aistleitner & Christian Grimm & Jakob Kapeller, 2018. "Auftragsvergabe, Leistungsqualitaet und Kostenintensitaet im Schienenpersonenverkehr. Eine internationale Perspektive," ICAE Working Papers 86, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
  • Handle: RePEc:ico:wpaper:86
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    References listed on IDEAS

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