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Who benefits from tax incentives? The heterogeneous wage incidence of a tax credit

Author

Listed:
  • Clément Carbonnier

    () (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LIEPP - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques [Sciences Po] - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France)

  • Clément Malgouyres

    (IPP - Institut des politiques publiques, PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Loriane Py

    (Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques)

  • Camille Urvoy

    (LIEPP - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques [Sciences Po] - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Do workers gain from lower business taxes, and why? We estimate how a large French corporate income tax credit is passed on to wages and explore the firm- and employee-level underlying mechanisms. The amount of tax credit firms get depends on their payroll share of workers paid less than a wage threshold. Exposure to the policy thus varies both across workers depending on their wage and across firms depending on their wage structure. Using exhaustive employer-employee data, we find that half of the surplus generated by the reform falls onto workers. Wage gains load on incumbents in high-skill occupations. The wage earnings of low-skill workers -- nearly all individually eligible -- do not change. This heterogeneous wage incidence is unlikely to be driven by scale effects or skill complementarities. We find that the groups of workers benefiting from wage gains are also more likely to continue working for the same firm. Further, we show that firms do not change their wage-setting behavior in response to the individual eligibility status of workers as there is no bunching in the distribution of entrants' wages. Overall, our results suggest that the wage incidence of firm taxation operates collectively through rent-sharing and benefits workers most costly to replace.

Suggested Citation

  • Clément Carbonnier & Clément Malgouyres & Loriane Py & Camille Urvoy, 2020. "Who benefits from tax incentives? The heterogeneous wage incidence of a tax credit," Working Papers halshs-02495652, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02495652
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02495652
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Giupponi, Giulia & Landais, Camille, 2018. "Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions: The Employment & Welfare Effects of Short Time Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 13310, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Giupponi, Giulia & Landais, Camille, 2018. "Subsidizing labor hoarding in recessions: the employment and welfare effects of short time work," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 91708, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    Keywords

    business taxation; tax incentives; wage incidence; rent sharing;

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