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Bank leverage, financial fragility and prudential regulation

  • Olivier Bruno

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)

  • André Cartapanis

    (CHERPA - Croyance, Histoire, Espace, Régulation Politique et Administrative - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Aix-en-Provence)

  • Eric Nasica


    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)

We analyse the determinants of banks' balance-sheet and leverage-ratio dynamics and their role in increasing financial fragility. Our results are twofold. First, we show that there is a value of bank's leverage that minimises financial fragility. Second, we show that this value depends on the overall business climate, the expected value of the collateral and the riskless interest rate. This result leads us to advocate the establishment of anadjustableleverage ratio, depending on economic conditions, rather than the fixed ratio provided for under the new Basel III regulation.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00853701.

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Date of creation: 23 Aug 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00853701
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  1. Blum, Jürg M., 2008. "Why 'Basel II' may need a leverage ratio restriction," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1699-1707, August.
  2. Robert Jarrow, 2013. "Capital adequacy rules, catastrophic firm failure, and systemic risk," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 219-231, October.
  3. Heid, Frank, 2007. "The cyclical effects of the Basel II capital requirements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3885-3900, December.
  4. Edward Zaik & John Walter & Gabriela Retting & Christopher James, 1996. "Raroc At Bank Of America: From Theory To Practice," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(2), pages 83-93.
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  8. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2009. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
  9. Arnold, Bruce & Borio, Claudio & Ellis, Luci & Moshirian, Fariborz, 2012. "Systemic risk, macroprudential policy frameworks, monitoring financial systems and the evolution of capital adequacy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3125-3132.
  10. John Geanakoplos, 2010. "Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1751, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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  12. Buch, Arne & Dorfleitner, Gregor & Wimmer, Maximilian, 2011. "Risk capital allocation for RORAC optimization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 3001-3009, November.
  13. Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger, 2009. "Bank capital structure and credit decisions," IMFS Working Paper Series 31, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Goethe University Frankfurt.
  14. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2003. "Loan Pricing Under Basel Capital Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 3917, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Repullo, Rafael & Saurina, Jesús, 2011. "The Countercyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III: A Critical Assessment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8304, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2009. "Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008," NBER Working Papers 15512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. John B. Taylor, 2009. "The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong," NBER Working Papers 14631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "The changing nature of financial intermediation and the financial crisis of 2007-09," Staff Reports 439, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  19. Cabral, Ricardo, 2013. "A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 103-117.
  20. John Geanakoplos, 2010. "Solving the present crisis and managing the leverage cycle," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 101-131.
  21. DellʼAriccia, Giovanni & Laeven, Luc & Marquez, Robert, 2014. "Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-taking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 65-99.
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