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Bank Leverage, Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation


  • Olivier Bruno

    University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France
    SKEMA Business School

  • André Cartapanis

    (Sciences Po Aix-en-Provence
    CHERPA-Sciences Po Aix-en-Provence)

  • Eric Nasica

    University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France)


We analyse the determinants of bank balance-sheets and leverage-ratio dynamics, and their role in increasing financial fragility. Our results are twofold. First, we show that there is a value of bank leverage that minimises financial fragility. Second, we show that this value depends on the overall business climate, the expected value of the collateral provided by firms, and the risk-free interest rate. These results lead us to advocate for the establishment of an adjustable leverage ratio depending on economic conditions, rather than the fixed ratio provided for under the new Basel III regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bruno & André Cartapanis & Eric Nasica, 2014. "Bank Leverage, Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-12, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-12

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Blum, Jürg M., 2008. "Why 'Basel II' may need a leverage ratio restriction," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1699-1707, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. André Cartapanis, 2011. "La crise financière et les politiques macroprudentielles. Inflexion réglementaire ou nouveau paradigme ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 62(3), pages 349-382.

    More about this item


    Bank leverage; Leverage ratio; Financial instability; Prudential regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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