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Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Julie Rosaz

    () (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    () (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish black lies (increasing the supervisor’s earnings while decreasing the worker’s payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)’s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor) are almost non-existent. The supervisors’ second-order beliefs and their decision to lie are highly correlated, suggesting that guilt aversion plays a role.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00947962, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00947962
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00947962
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Lohse, Tim & Qari, Salmai, 2014. "Deception choice and self-selection – The importance of being earnest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 25-39.
    2. Antonio Filippin & Paolo Crosetto, 2016. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(11), pages 3138-3160, November.
    3. Ritwik Banerjee, 2015. "On the interpretation of World Values Survey trust question - global expectations vs. local beliefs," Economics Working Papers 2015-19, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    4. repec:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen & Daniel Houser, 2013. "Promises and Lies: An Experiment on Detecting Deception," Working Papers 1038, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Feb 2013.
    6. Natalia Borzino & Enrique Fatas & Emmanuel Peterle, 2015. "In Gov we trust: Voluntary compliance in networked investment games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-21, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field An Experiment in Public Transportations," Working Papers halshs-01265696, HAL.
    8. Olivier Body & Régine Kolinsky, 2014. "To Win or Not to Lose: an Experiment on Communication Efforts," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-17, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-016-9491-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Christoph Vanberg, 2017. "Who never tells a lie?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 448-459, June.
    11. Barr, Abigail & Michailidou, Georgia, 2017. "Complicity without connection or communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 1-10.
    12. Lohse, Tim & Konrad, Kai A. & Qari, Salmai, 2014. "Deception Choice and Audit Design - The Importance of Being Earnest," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100577, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Bernd Irlenbusch & Marie Claire Villeval, 2015. "Behavioral ethics: how psychology influenced economics and how economics might inform psychology?," Post-Print halshs-01159696, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lies; deception; self-image; guilt aversion; lie-aversion; evaluation; experiments;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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