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The capital structure and governance of a mortgage securitization utility

Author

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  • Patricia C. Mosser
  • Joseph Tracy
  • Joshua Wright

Abstract

We explore the capital structure and governance of a mortgage-insuring securitization utility operating with government reinsurance for systemic or ?tail? risk. The structure we propose for the replacement of the GSEs focuses on aligning incentives for appropriate pricing and transfer of mortgage risks across the private sector and between the private sector and the government. We present the justification and mechanics of a vintage-based capital structure, and assess the components of the mortgage guarantee fee, whose size we find is most sensitive to the required capital ratio and the expected return on that capital. We discuss the implications of selling off some of the utility?s mortgage credit risk to the capital markets and how the informational value of such transactions may vary with the level of risk transfer. Finally, we explore how mutualization could address incentive misalignments arising out of securitization and government insurance, as well as how the governance structure for such a financial market utility could be designed.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia C. Mosser & Joseph Tracy & Joshua Wright, 2013. "The capital structure and governance of a mortgage securitization utility," Staff Reports 644, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:644
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonas Meuli & Thomas Nellen & Thomas Nitschka, 2021. "Covered bonds, loan growth and bank funding: The Swiss experience since 1932," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 77-94, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial market utility; mortgage finance; GSE; cooperatives; MBS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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