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A private lender cooperative model for residential mortgage finance

Author

Listed:
  • Toni Dechario
  • Patricia C. Mosser
  • Joseph Tracy
  • James Vickery
  • Joshua Wright

Abstract

We describe a set of six design principles for the reorganization of the U.S. housing finance system and apply them to one model for replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that has so far received frequent mention but little sustained analysis ? the lender cooperative utility. We discuss the pros and cons of such a model and propose a method for organizing participation in a mutual loss pool and an explicit, priced government insurance mechanism. We also discuss how these principles and this model are consistent with preserving the ?to-be-announced,? or TBA, market ? particularly if the fixed-rate mortgage remains a focus of public policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Toni Dechario & Patricia C. Mosser & Joseph Tracy & James Vickery & Joshua Wright, 2010. "A private lender cooperative model for residential mortgage finance," Staff Reports 466, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:466
    Note: For a published version of this report, see Toni Dechario, Patricia Mosser, Joseph Tracy, James Vickery, and Joshua Wright, "A Private Lender Cooperative Model for Residential Mortgage Finance," in Susan Wachter and Marvin Smith, eds., The American Mortgage System: Crisis and Reform, 286-304. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. A. Cole, Rebel & Mehran, Hamid, 1998. "The effect of changes in ownership structure on performance: Evidence from the thrift industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 291-317, December.
    2. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001. "Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 379-398, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Fuster & James Vickery, 2015. "Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(1), pages 176-211.
    2. W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall & Lawrence J. White, 2012. "The devil's in the tail: residential mortgage finance and the U.S. Treasury," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2012-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. James Vickery & Joshua Wright, 2013. "TBA trading and liquidity in the agency MBS market," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 19(May), pages 1-18.
    4. Robert Hockett, 2013. "Paying Paul and robbing no one: an eminent domain solution for underwater mortgage debt," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 19(Jun).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GSE; MBS; mortgage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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