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Crise et régulation des marchés financiers : Quel impact sur les formes mutuelles dans l'assurance ?

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  • Fabrice Roth

    (Laboratoire de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon)

Abstract

La performance des organisations est un thème classique en finance et en gouvernance. Le principe de la survie organisationnelle postule que les organisations qui survivent dans une activité économique donnée sont celles qui fournissent un produit au prix le plus faible tout en couvrant les coûts d'agence et de production. Cette approche conduit à comparer différentes formes d'organisation en termes d'avantages-coût. Cette question est régulièrement débattue dans le secteur de l'assurance, dans lequel coexistent des sociétés par actions et des mutuelles. Depuis le 19e siècle, le poids relatif des mutuelles a constamment diminué. Le développement des marchés financiers accompagnant la globalisation de l'économie a naturellement profité aux SA, questionnant la viabilité du mutualisme. Pourtant, la présence encore forte des mutuelles atteste que celles-ci possèdent certains avantages concurrentiels. L'objet de cet article est de présenter ces avantages dans le contexte économique et financier actuel.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Roth, 2012. "Crise et régulation des marchés financiers : Quel impact sur les formes mutuelles dans l'assurance ?," Working Papers halshs-00692342, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00692342
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00692342
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