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Rollover risk as market discipline: a two-sided inefficiency

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Abstract

Why does the market discipline that financial intermediaries face seem too weak during booms and too strong during crises? This paper shows in a general equilibrium setting that rollover risk as a disciplining device is effective only if all intermediaries face purely idiosyncratic risk. However, if assets are correlated, a two-sided inefficiency arises: Good aggregate states have intermediaries taking excessive risks, while bad aggregate states suffer from costly fire sales. The driving force behind this inefficiency is an amplifying feedback loop between asset values and market discipline. In equilibrium, financial intermediaries inefficiently amplify both positive and negative aggregate shocks.

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  • Eisenbach, Thomas M., 2013. "Rollover risk as market discipline: a two-sided inefficiency," Staff Reports 597, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, revised 01 Oct 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:597
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    2. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2014. "Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2343-2380, December.
    3. Ing-Haw Cheng & Konstantin Milbradt, 2012. "The Hazards of Debt: Rollover Freezes, Incentives, and Bailouts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(4), pages 1070-1110.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gur Huberman & Rafael Repullo, 2013. "Moral Hazard and Debt Maturity," Working Papers wp2013_1311, CEMFI.
    2. Toni Ahnert, 2016. "Rollover Risk, Liquidity and Macroprudential Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(8), pages 1753-1785, December.
    3. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay & Leonello, Agnese, 2015. "Government Guarantees and Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Philipp K├Ânig & David Pothier, 2014. "Asymmetric Information and Roll-over Risk," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1364, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Choi, Dong Boem & Eisenbach, Thomas M. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2015. "Watering a lemon tree: heterogeneous risk taking and monetary policy transmission," Staff Reports 724, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, revised 01 Nov 2017.
    6. Linda Schilling, 2018. "Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution," Working Papers 2018-15, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    7. Sophia Chen, 2015. "Uncertainty and Investment; The Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet Channel," IMF Working Papers 15/65, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    rollover risk; market discipline; fire sales; global games;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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