Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts
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References listed on IDEAS
- John O. Ledyard & Mark Olson & David Porter & Joseph A. Swanson & David P. Torma, 2002.
"The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services,"
INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 4-12, October.
- Ledyard, John O. & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Swanson, Joseph A. & Torma, David P., 2000. "The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services," Working Papers 1093, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Game theory and the spectrum auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 771-778, May.
- John O. Ledyard & David Porter & Antonio Rangel, 1997. "Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 639-675, September.
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KeywordsMultiple units; non-constant costs; asymmetric redemption values; alternative procurement mechanisms;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
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