IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/canjag/v62y2014i3p411-433.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Author

Listed:
  • M. S. Iftekhar
  • A. Hailu
  • R. K. Lindner

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="fr"> Les enchères de conservation permettent à des propriétaires fonciers de proposer des projets de conservation et des paiements connexes (offres) qui sont soumis à l'examen d'un organisme de conservation. Dernièrement, il a été proposé d'utiliser des mécanismes d'enchères combinatoires itératifs afin d'améliorer les résultats des enchères de conservation. Les enchères combinatoires permettent aux propriétaires fonciers de proposer des projets qui comprennent des activités destinées à fournir un ou plusieurs services. Le mécanisme itératif permet aux enchérisseurs d'examiner graduellement le type de projets qu'ils souhaitent offrir; dans ce cas, les enchérisseurs obtiennent de la rétroaction sur les prix fondée sur les résultats de tours d'enchères intermédiaires. Les mécanismes d'enchères varient en fonction de la rétroaction sur les prix et réagissent différemment aux conditions du marché. À l'heure actuelle, nous manquons d'information quant à leur performance sur les marchés lorsque les niveaux de concurrence varient (nombre d'enchérisseurs et niveau cible). À l'aide d'un modèle multi-agent, nous avons évalué certains mécanismes d'enchères itératifs. Les résultats de notre étude indiquent qu'un degré de concurrence élevé accroît l'efficacité des enchères. Dans un contexte où la concurrence est élevée, les résultats quant à l'efficacité sont moins sensibles au choix des mécanismes d'enchères. Ainsi, un commissaire-priseur (encanteur) pourrait jouir d'une certaine liberté quant au choix du mécanisme d'enchères s'il était possible de garantir un niveau de concurrence adéquat. Par contre, dans les contextes où la concurrence est faible, certains mécanismes d'enchères donnent de meilleurs résultats.

Suggested Citation

  • M. S. Iftekhar & A. Hailu & R. K. Lindner, 2014. "Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 62(3), pages 411-433, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:canjag:v:62:y:2014:i:3:p:411-433
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/cjag.12028
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juan Aparicio & Mercedes Landete & Juan Monge & Inmaculada Sirvent, 2008. "A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 16(2), pages 319-344, December.
    2. Lalive, Rafael & Schmutzler, Armin, 2008. "Exploring the effects of competition for railway markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 443-458, March.
    3. Laura Brown & Elizabeth Troutt & Cynthia Edwards & Brian Gray & Wanjing Hu, 2011. "A Uniform Price Auction for Conservation Easements in the Canadian Prairies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(1), pages 49-60, September.
    4. Brannman, Lance & Klein, J Douglass & Weiss, Leonard W, 1987. "The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(1), pages 24-32, February.
    5. Tobias Scheffel & Georg Ziegler & Martin Bichler, 2012. "On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 667-692, December.
    6. Anthony M. Kwasnica & John O. Ledyard & Dave Porter & Christine DeMartini, 2005. "A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 419-434, March.
    7. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
    8. Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2010. "What Format for Multi-Unit Multiple-Bid Auctions?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 189-209, March.
    9. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, February.
    10. Connor, Jeffery D. & Ward, John R. & Bryan, Brett, 2008. "Exploring the cost effectiveness of land conservation auctions and payment policies," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(3), pages 1-17.
    11. Stoneham, Gary & Chaudhri, Vivek & Ha, Arthur & Strappazzon, Loris, 2003. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria’s BushTender trial," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1-24.
    12. Gary Stoneham & Vivek Chaudhri & Arthur Ha & Loris Strappazzon, 2003. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 477-500, December.
    13. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
    14. Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
    15. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 111-111.
    16. V. Flambard & I. Perrigne, 2006. "Asymmetry in procurement auctions: some evidence from snow removal contracts," Post-Print hal-00323914, HAL.
    17. Véronique Flambard & Isabelle Perrigne, 2006. "Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Snow Removal Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1014-1036, October.
    18. Boxall, Peter C. & Perger, Orsolya & Packman, Katherine & Weber, Marian, 2017. "An experimental examination of target based conservation auctions," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 592-600.
    19. Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
    20. Anders Lunander & Jan-Eric Nilsson, 2004. "Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-58, January.
    21. Whitten, Stuart M. & Reeson, Andrew & Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John, 2008. "Barriers to and Opportunities for Increasing Participation in Conservation Auctions," 2008 Conference (52nd), February 5-8, 2008, Canberra, Australia 5973, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    22. Sandra Saïd & Sophie Thoyer, 2007. "Agri-environmental auctions with synergies," Working Papers 07-07, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Sep 2007.
    23. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
    24. Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2007. "Designing Multi‐unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent‐based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 83(s1), pages 57-72, September.
    25. repec:hrv:faseco:33445961 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
    27. Chen, Yan & Takeuchi, Kan, 2010. "Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 557-579, March.
    28. Jeffery D. Connor & John R. Ward & Brett Bryan, 2008. "Exploring the cost effectiveness of land conservation auctions and payment policies ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(3), pages 303-319, September.
    29. Kwerel, Evan R & Rosston, Gregory L, 2000. "An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 253-289, May.
    30. John Rolfe & Romy Greiner & Jill Windle & Atakelty Hailu, 2011. "Testing for allocation efficiencies in water quality tenders across catchments, industries and pollutants: a north Queensland case study," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 55(4), pages 518-536, October.
    31. TeckH. Ho & Xin Wang & ColinF. Camerer, 2008. "Individual Differences in EWA Learning with Partial Payoff Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 37-59, January.
    32. Adam Arsenault & James Nolan & Richard Schoney & Donald Gilchrist, 2012. "Outstanding in the Field: Evaluating Auction Markets for Farmland Using Multi-Agent Simulation," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sayed, Iftekhar & John, Tisdell, 2016. "An agent based analysis of the impacts of land use restriction and network structures on participation in conservation reserve programs," Working Papers 250161, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sharma, Bijay P. & Cho, Seong-Hoon & Yu, T. Edward, 2019. "Designing cost-efficient payments for forest-based carbon sequestration: An auction-based modeling approach," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 182-194.
    2. Iftekhar, M. S. & Tisdell, J. G., 2018. "Learning in repeated multiple unit combinatorial auctions: An experimental study," Working Papers 267301, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    3. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    4. Whitten, Stuart M., 2017. "Designing and implementing conservation tender metrics: Twelve core considerations," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 561-571.
    5. John Rolfe & Jill Windle & Juliana McCosker, 2009. "Testing and Implementing the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions: A Case Study Application," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 57(3), pages 287-303, September.
    6. Rolfe, John & Whitten, Stuart & Windle, Jill, 2017. "The Australian experience in using tenders for conservation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 611-620.
    7. Messer, Kent D. & Duke, Joshua M. & Lynch, Lori & Li, Tongzhe, 2017. "When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 212-226.
    8. Bruno Wichmann & Peter Boxall & Scott Wilson & Orsolya Pergery, 2017. "Auctioning Risky Conservation Contracts," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(4), pages 1111-1144, December.
    9. Iftekhar, Md Sayed & Tisdell, John G., 2015. "Bidding and performance in multiple unit combinatorial fishery quota auctions: Role of information feedbacks," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 233-243.
    10. Latacz-Lohmann, U. & Schilizzi, S. & Breustedt, G., 2012. "Auctioning outcome-based conservation contracts," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 47, March.
    11. Vergamini, Daniele & Viaggi, Davide & Raggi, Meri, 2020. "Evaluating the Potential Contribution of Multi-Attribute Auctions to Achieve Agri-Environmental Targets and Efficient Payment Design," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    12. M. Iftekhar & A. Hailu & R. Lindner, 2012. "The Effect of Bidder Heterogeneity on Combinatorial Conservation Auction Designs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(1), pages 137-157, September.
    13. Lewis, David J. & Plantinga, Andrew J. & Nelson, Erik & Polasky, Stephen, 2011. "The efficiency of voluntary incentive policies for preventing biodiversity loss," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 192-211, January.
    14. Simanti Banerjee & Anthony Kwasnica & James Shortle, 2015. "Information and Auction Performance: A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(3), pages 409-431, July.
    15. Iho, Antti & Lankoski, Jussi & Ollikainen, Markku & Puustinen, Markku & Lehtimäki, Jonne, 2014. "Agri-environmental auctions for phosphorus load reduction: experiences from a Finnish pilot," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 58(2), April.
    16. Boxall, Peter C. & Perger, Orsolya & Packman, Katherine & Weber, Marian, 2017. "An experimental examination of target based conservation auctions," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 592-600.
    17. Choi, Pak-Sing & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2018. "Conservation procurement auctions with bidirectional externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 559-579.
    18. Iftekhar, M.S. & Tisdell, J.G. & Connor, J.D., 2013. "Effects of competition on environmental water buyback auctions," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 59-73.
    19. Pengfei Liu, 2021. "Balancing Cost Effectiveness and Incentive Properties in Conservation Auctions: Experimental Evidence from Three Multi-award Reverse Auction Mechanisms," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(3), pages 417-451, March.
    20. Stoneham, Gary & O'Keefe, Andrew & Eigenraam, Mark & Bain, David, 2012. "Creating physical environmental asset accounts from markets for ecosystem conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 114-122.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:canjag:v:62:y:2014:i:3:p:411-433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/caefmea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/caefmea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.