The Role of Marriage in Fighting HIV: A Quantitative Illustration for Malawi
How might policies that promote marriage and/or dissuade divorce help in the fight against HIV/AIDS? This question is addressed employing a choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model, using Malawi as a case study. In the framework developed, individuals can choose between married and single life. A single person can select among abstinence and sex with or without a condom. The results suggest that marriage-friendly policies can help to abate HIV/AIDS. The policy predictions that obtain from general equilibrium analysis are compared with those that arise from simulated synthetic field experiments and epidemiological studies. AEA, Papers and Proceedings, forthcoming.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of the AIDS Epidemic," NBER Working Papers 5428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Kremer, 1996. "Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(2), pages 549-573.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eag:rereps:28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jeremy Greenwood)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.