Escaping Epidemics Through Migration? Quarantine Measures under Asymmetric Information about Infection Risk
This paper explores implications of the fact that individuals know more than the authorities about their risk of infection and can take migration decisions before their health status is publicly observable. In a 2-period model we study under which conditions the presence of quarantine measures may lead to inefficient outcomes as individuals' interest in migration to escape centres of disease may become stronger and generate negative externalities imposed on other uninfected individuals.
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|Date of creation:||May 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Public Economics, vol.�93, n°7-8, août 2009, p.�931-938.|
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- Mark Gersovitz & Jeffrey S. Hammer, 2004.
"The Economical Control of Infectious Diseases,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 1-27, 01.
- Geoffard, P.Y. & Philipson, T., 1995.
"Rational Epidemics and their Public Control,"
DELTA Working Papers
95-15, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Mesnard, Alice & Seabright, Paul, 2008. "Migration and The Equilibrium Prevalence of Infectious Diseases," CEPR Discussion Papers 6651, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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