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Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals

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  • David A. Hennessy

Abstract

We develop a dynamic capital valuation model in which each farm can take an action with farm-varying cost to increase the probability of not contracting a disease. In the presence of infection externalities, circumstances are identified under which multiple equilibria exist and where the one involving the most extensive set of action takers is socially optimal. It is suggested that costly capital markets are one factor in determining the extent of endemic disease in a region. The introduction of frictions, such as dealing with a cumbersome veterinary public health bureaucracy, can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity actions. Some technical innovations can reduce social welfare. The model is also extended to study a voluntary herd depopulation scheme. Moral hazard in the biosecurity action will dampen the scheme's welfare effect.

Suggested Citation

  • David A. Hennessy, 2005. "Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp418, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:05-wp418
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xie, Fang & Horan, Richard D., 2009. "Disease and Behavioral Dynamics for Brucellosis Control in Elk and Cattle in the Greater Yellowstone Area," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-23.
    2. Benjamin M. Gramig & Richard D. Horan, 2011. "Jointly determined livestock disease dynamics and decentralised economic behaviour," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 55(3), pages 393-410, July.
    3. Xie, Fang & Horan, Richard D., 2008. "Disease and Behavioral Dynamics for Brucellosis in Elk and Cattle in the Greater Yellowstone Area," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6404, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    4. repec:eee:thpobi:v:90:y:2013:i:c:p:135-144 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. David A. Hennessy, 2013. "Biosecurity Externalities and Indemnities for Infectious Animal Diseases," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 13-wp539, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    6. Benjamin M. Gramig & Richard D. Horan & Christopher A. Wolf, 2008. "Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard Is Followed by Adverse Selection," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(3), pages 627-641.
    7. Tong Wang & David A. Hennessy, 2015. "Strategic Interactions Among Private and Public Efforts When Preventing and Stamping Out a Highly Infectious Animal Disease," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 97(2), pages 435-451.
    8. Tong Wang & Seong Cheol Park, 2014. "Livestock Disease Indemnity Design under Common Uncertainty: A Multi-agent Problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1396-1409.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    biosecurity; continuous time; multiple equilibria; Nash behavior; reinfection.;

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture

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