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Réforme de la protection de l’emploi et inégalités face au chômage dans un modèle d’appariement

  • Olivier Charlot

    (Université des Antilles et de la Guyane, LEAD et CIRPEE)

  • Franck Malherbet

    (THEMA - CNRS, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, IZA and fRDB)

Cet article s'intéresse aux effets liés à l'introduction d'un système de modulation des cotisations patronales à l'assurance chômage (ou expérience rating) sur le niveau et la structure du chômage par qualification. Nous construisons pour cela un modèle d'appariement dans lequel l'évolution de la demande de travail, les décisions de créations et de destruction d'emplois, ainsi que l'évolution des taxes destinées à financer l'assurance chômage sont endogènes. Dans ce cadre, la protection de l'emploi a des effets qui peuvent être différenciés selon le niveau de qualification considéré. L'introduction d'un système de modulation des cotisations employeur à l'assurance chômage pourrait améliorer le fonctionnement du marché du travail; l'importance des éventuels effets indésirables liés à ce système dépend de la capacité à substituer la taxe d'expérience rating aux dispositifs de protection de l'emploi déjà en place. La hausse des incitations à se qualifier réduit en partie l'importance de ce problème.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2010013.

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Length: 55
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010013
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  1. Cahuc, Pierre & Malherbet, Franck, 2002. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Labor Market Rigidity," IZA Discussion Papers 581, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Pauline Givord & Eric Maurin, 2001. "Changes in Job Stability and their Causes : An Empirical Analysis Method applied to France, 1982-2000," Working Papers 2001-07, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  3. Cahuc, Pierre & Michel, Philippe, 1996. "Minimum wage unemployment and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1463-1482, August.
  4. DREZE, Jacques H. & SNEESSENS, Henri, 1994. "Technical Development, Competition from Low-Wage Economies and Low-Skilled Unemployment," CORE Discussion Papers 1994036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Daniel Cohen & Arnaud Lefranc & Gilles Saint-Paul, 1997. "French unemployment: a transatlantic perspective," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 12(25), pages 265-292, October.
  6. Olivier Charlot, 2006. "Éducation, destruction des emplois et performance du marché du travail dans un modèle d'appariement," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(1), pages 5-33.
  7. Olivier L'Haridon & Franck Malherbet, 2003. "Protection de l’emploi et performance du marché du travail," Working Papers 2003-19, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  8. Etienne Wasmer, 2006. "General versus Specific Skills in Labor Markets with Search Frictions and Firing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 811-831, June.
  9. Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2005. "Unemployment Insurance And Experience Rating: Insurance Versus Efficiency ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1303-1319, November.
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