IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ema/worpap/2008-31.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Réforme de la protection de l'emploi et inégalités face au chômage dans un modèle d'appariement

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier CHARLOT

    (Universite de Franche-Comte, LIBRE et CIRPEE. UFR SJEPG, 45d, Avenue de l'observatoire, 25030 Besancon Cedex)

  • Franck MALHERBET

    (THEMA - CNRS - Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

Abstract

Cet article s'interesse aux effets lies a l'introduction d'un systeme de modula- tion des cotisations patronales a l'assurance chomage (ou experience rating) sur le niveau et la structure du chômage par qualification. Nous construisons pour cela un modèle d'appariement dans lequel l'evolution de la demande de travail, les décisions de création et destruction d'emplois, ainsi que l'evolution des taxes destinees a fi nancer l'assurance chomage sont endogènes. Dans ce cadre, la protection de l'emploi a des effets qui peuvent etre differencies selon le niveau de qualification considere. L'introduction d'un systeme de modulation des cotisations employeur a l'assurance chomage pourrait ameliorer le fonctionnement du marche du travail ; l'importance des eventuels effets indesirables lies a ce systeme depend a court terme de la capacite a substituer la taxe d'experience rating aux dispositifs de protection de l'emploi deja en place, tandis qu'a plus long terme la hausse des incitations a se qualifier reduit en partie l'importance de ce probleme.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier CHARLOT & Franck MALHERBET, 2008. "Réforme de la protection de l'emploi et inégalités face au chômage dans un modèle d'appariement," THEMA Working Papers 2008-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2008-31
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2008-31.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Duhautois, 2002. "Les réallocations d'emplois en France sont-elles en phase avec le cycle ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 351(1), pages 87-103.
    2. Anderson, Patricia M. & Meyer, Bruce D., 2000. "The effects of the unemployment insurance payroll tax on wages, employment, claims and denials," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 81-106, October.
    3. Cahuc, Pierre & Zylberberg, André, 1999. "Job protection, minimum wage and employment," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9914, CEPREMAP.
    4. Etienne Wasmer & Philippe Weil, 2004. "The Macroeconomics of Labor and Credit Market Imperfections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 944-963, September.
    5. Cahuc, Pierre & Malherbet, Franck, 2004. "Unemployment compensation finance and labor market rigidity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 481-501, March.
    6. Olivier J. Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2008. "The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 45-77, March.
    7. Cahuc, Pierre & Michel, Philippe, 1996. "Minimum wage unemployment and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1463-1482, August.
    8. Pauline Givord & Eric Maurin, 2001. "Changes in Job Stability and their Causes : An Empirical Analysis Method applied to France, 1982-2000," Working Papers 2001-07, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    9. Olivier Charlot, 2006. "Éducation, destruction des emplois et performance du marché du travail dans un modèle d'appariement," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(1), pages 5-33.
    10. Etienne Wasmer, 2006. "General versus Specific Skills in Labor Markets with Search Frictions and Firing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 811-831, June.
    11. Card, David & Levine, Phillip B., 1994. "Unemployment insurance taxes and the cyclical and seasonal properties of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
    12. Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(2), pages 299-314, June.
    13. Olivier L'Haridon & Franck Malherbet, 2003. "Protection de l'emploi et performance du marché du travail," Working Papers 2003-19, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    14. Deere, Donald R, 1991. "Unemployment Insurance and Employment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 307-324, October.
    15. Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2005. "Unemployment Insurance And Experience Rating: Insurance Versus Efficiency ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1303-1319, November.
    16. DREZE, Jacques H. & SNEESSENS, Henri, 1994. "Technical Development, Competition from Low-Wage Economies and Low-Skilled Unemployment," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Berson, Clémence & Ferrari, Nicolas, 2015. "Financial incentives and labour market duality," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 77-92.
    2. Francesco Palma & Yann Thommen, 2020. "Employment Protection Reform in European Labor Markets: The Collective Bargaining Regime Matters," De Economist, Springer, vol. 168(4), pages 541-575, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2009. "Employment protection reform in search economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 255-273, April.
    2. Sahin Avcioglu & Bilgehan Karabay, 2020. "Labor market regulation under self‐enforcing contracts," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 1965-2018, December.
    3. Berson, Clémence & Ferrari, Nicolas, 2015. "Financial incentives and labour market duality," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 77-92.
    4. Audrey Guo & Andrew C. Johnston, 2021. "The Finance of Unemployment Compensation and Its Consequences," Public Finance Review, , vol. 49(3), pages 392-434, May.
    5. Frédéric Gavrel, 2019. "Directed search, mismatch and efficiency," Working Papers halshs-02083453, HAL.
    6. José María Arranz & Carlos García Serrano, 2015. "Los sistemas de prestaciones por desempleo de “experience rating”. Un análisis de los despidos temporales y los subsidios cruzados en España," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 212(1), pages 129-168, March.
    7. Frédéric Gavrel, 2018. "The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 404-411, April.
    8. Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Experience Rating of Unemployment Insurance in the US: A Model for Europe?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(2), pages 45-50, 07.
    9. Albertini, Julien & Fairise, Xavier & Terriau, Anthony, 2023. "Unemployment insurance, recalls, and experience rating," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    10. Andrew C. Johnston, 2021. "Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor Demand: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Administrative Data," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 266-293, February.
    11. Cahuc, Pierre & Malherbet, Franck, 2004. "Unemployment compensation finance and labor market rigidity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 481-501, March.
    12. Rainer Eppel & Thomas Horvath & Helmut Mahringer, 2018. "Das Aussetzen von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen als betriebliche Strategie zum Ausgleich schwankenden Personalbedarfs. Ein Update," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 61245, Juni.
    13. Frédéric Gavrel, 2017. "The Magic of Layoff Taxes Requires Equilibrium Stability," Working Papers halshs-01462917, HAL.
    14. Albertini, Julien & Fairise, Xavier, 2013. "Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 1796-1813.
    15. repec:ces:ifodic:v:3:y:2005:i:2:p:14567656 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Michau, Jean-Baptiste, 2015. "Optimal labor market policy with search frictions and risk-averse workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 93-107.
    17. Rebollo-Sanz, Yolanda, 2012. "Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-426.
    18. Guo, Audrey & Johnston, Andrew C., 2020. "The Finance of Unemployment Compensation and its Consequence for the Labor Market," IZA Discussion Papers 13330, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Malherbet, Franck & L'Haridon, Olivier, 2002. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Olivier Charlot, 2006. "Éducation, destruction des emplois et performance du marché du travail dans un modèle d'appariement," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(1), pages 5-33.
    21. Vikström, Johan, 2009. "The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages," Working Paper Series 2009:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Destruction d'emplois ; Coûts de licenciement ; Experience rating;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2008-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stefania Marcassa (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/themafr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.