IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/scandj/v107y2005i2p299-314.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers

Author

Listed:
  • Julia Fath
  • Clemens Fuest

Abstract

While layoff costs in the U.S. are mostly due to experience-rated unemployment insurance, layoff costs in European labour markets are primarily a consequence of employment protection laws. In this paper we compare the effects of experience rating and employment protection laws on employment and welfare in a model where unemployment arises due to efficiency wage setting and where labour turnover is inefficiently high. We show that a revenue-neutral introduction of experience rating reduces labour turnover and increases employment and welfare. The introduction of employment protection laws may also reduce labour turnover but employment declines. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2005 .

Suggested Citation

  • Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(2), pages 299-314, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:107:y:2005:i:2:p:299-314
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=sjoe&volume=107&issue=2&year=2005&part=null
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rotemberg, Julio J., 1985. "Money and the terms of trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 141-160.
    2. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1982. "Interest rates and currency prices in a two-country world," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 335-359.
    3. Kollman, R., 1996. "The Exchange Rate in a Dynamic-Optimizing Current Account Model with Nominal Rigidities: a Quantitative Investigation," Cahiers de recherche 9614, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    4. Obstfeld, Maurice & Taylor, Alan M., 1997. "Nonlinear Aspects of Goods-Market Arbitrage and Adjustment: Heckscher's Commodity Points Revisited," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, pages 441-479.
    5. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 1037-1047.
    6. Alvarez, Fernando & Atkeson, Andrew, 1997. "Money and exchange rates in the Grossman-Weiss-Rotemberg model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 619-640.
    7. Kenneth Rogoff, 1996. "The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 647-668.
    8. Susanto Basu & John G. Fernald, 1995. "Aggregate Productivity and the Productivity of Aggregates," NBER Working Papers 5382, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Mussa, Michael, 1982. "A Model of Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(1), pages 74-104, February.
    10. Stockman, Alan C., 1988. "Real exchange-rate variability under pegged and floating nominal exchange-rate systems: An equilibrium theory," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 259-294.
    11. Kimball, Miles S, 1995. "The Quantitative Analytics of the Basic Neomonetarist Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1241-1277, November.
    12. Schlagenhauf, Don E. & Wrase, Jeffrey M., 1995. "Liquidity and real activity in a simple open economy model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 431-461.
    13. Grilli, Vittorio & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Liquidity and exchange rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 339-352.
    14. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1990. "Liquidity and interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 237-264, April.
    15. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters,in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, January.
    17. Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 473-500.
    18. Rodriguez Mendizabal, Hugo, 2002. "Monetary Union and the Transaction Cost Savings of a Single Currency," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 263-277, May.
    19. Charles Engel & John H. Rogers, 1995. "Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price: The Roles of Geography vs. Currencies," NBER Working Papers 5395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Romer, David, 1987. "The monetary transmission mechanism in a general equilibrium version of the baumol-tobin model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 105-122.
    21. Helpman, Elhanan & Razin, Assaf, 1982. "A Comparison of Exchange Rate Regimes in the Presence of Imperfect Capital Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 365-388, June.
    22. Dowd, Kevin & Greenaway, David, 1993. "Currency Competition, Network Externalities and Switching Costs: Towards an Alternative View of Optimum Currency Areas," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1180-1189, September.
    23. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-325, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Gavrel, 2017. "The Magic of Layoff Taxes Requires Equilibrium Stability," Post-Print halshs-01462917, HAL.
    2. Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(4), pages 471-483, November.
    3. Frédéric Gavrel, 2017. "The Magic of Layoff Taxes Requires Equilibrium Stability," Working Papers halshs-01462917, HAL.
    4. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon, 2008. "Does the market provide sufficient employment protection?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 406-422, June.
    5. repec:ces:ifodic:v:3:y:2005:i:2:p:14567656 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Andre Kurmann & Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, 2006. "Credit Market Frictions with Costly Capital Reallocation as a Propagation Mechanism," 2006 Meeting Papers 365, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. José María Arranz & Carlos García Serrano, 2015. "Los sistemas de prestaciones por desempleo de “experience rating”. Un análisis de los despidos temporales y los subsidios cruzados en España," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, pages 129-168.
    8. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2009. "Employment protection reform in search economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 255-273, April.
    9. Hans G. Bloemen & Silvia Pasqua & Elena G. F. Stancanelli, 2008. "An Empirical Analysis Of The Time Allocation Of Italian Couples: Are Italian Men Irresponsive?," CHILD Working Papers wp18_08, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
    10. Olivier Charlot & Franck Malherbet, 2010. "Réforme de la protection de l'emploi et inégalités face au chômage dans un modèle d'appariement," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(1), pages 57-112.
    11. Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Risk aversion does not justify the introduction of mandatory unemployment insurance in the shirking model," Working Paper Series in Economics 19, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    12. Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Experience Rating of Unemployment Insurance in the US: A Model for Europe?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(2), pages 45-50, 07.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:107:y:2005:i:2:p:299-314. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.