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The effects of the marginal tax rate in a matching model with endogenous labor supply

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  • Alexis, PARMENTIER

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of the marginal tax rate on unemployment and economic efficiency in a matching model with homogenous agents when wages and working hours are bargained over. I show that the theoretical impact of a higher marginal tax rate on unemployment is ambiguous whatever the instantaneous utility in unemployment i.e. for an utility in unemployment that is either fixed or perfectly indexed on net wages. These results are in sharp contrast with the literature. Numerical simulations applied to France suggest that a higher marginal tax rate generally reduces the unemployment rate but at the expense of lower economic efficiency. The simulations point also out that the relation between the optimal marginal tax rate and the elasticity of labor supply is not monotonic.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexis, PARMENTIER, 2006. "The effects of the marginal tax rate in a matching model with endogenous labor supply," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006011, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006011
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2006-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Etienne Lehmann & Claudio Lucifora & Simone Moriconi & Bruno Van der Linden, 2016. "Beyond the labour income tax wedge: the unemployment-reducing effect of tax progressivity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 454-489, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching model; Marginal Tax Rate; Labor supply; Utility in unemployment;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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