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Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

Listed author(s):
  • Boeters, Stefan

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Modelling.

Volume (Year): 28 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 2282-2295

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:28:y:2011:i:5:p:2282-2295
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411

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