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Tax Progression in Imperfect Labour Markets : A Survey

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  • Mathias, HUNGERBUEHLER

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) and ERMES, Université Paris II)

Abstract

We look at the effect of tax progression in imperfect labour markets. The models considered are union models, an equilibrium search model with wage bargaining, an equilibrium search model with wage posting by firms and efficiency wage models. We find that in all basic models, an increase in tax progression leads to lower wages and higher employment. Extensions of the models can however change these results.

Suggested Citation

  • Mathias, HUNGERBUEHLER, 2004. "Tax Progression in Imperfect Labour Markets : A Survey," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2004032, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2004032
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax progression; Redistribution; Labour Market Imperfections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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