Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and evidence from computer markets
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- Christos Genakos & Kai Uwe Kühn & John Van Reenen, 2011. "Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets," CEP Discussion Papers dp1060, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Christos Genakos & Kai-Uwe Kühn & John Van Reenen, 2011. "Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets," NBER Working Papers 17172, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
- Laura Nurski, 2012. "Net Neutrality, Foreclosure and the Fast Lane: An empirical study of the UK," Working Papers 12-13, NET Institute.
- Kai-Uwe Kühn & Svend Albæk & Miguel Mano, 2011. "Economics at DG Competition, 2010–2011," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(4), pages 311-325, December.
More about this item
Keywords
anti-trust; demand estimation; foreclosure; interoperability;JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-08-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-08-09 (Industrial Organization)
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