Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets
When will a monopolist have incentives to foreclose a complementary market by degrading compatibility/interoperability of his products with those of rivals? We develop a framework where leveraging extracts more rents from the monopoly market by "restoring" second degree price discrimination. In a random coefficient model with complements we derive a policy test for when incentives to reduce rival quality will hold. Our application is to Microsoft's strategic incentives to leverage market power from personal computer to server operating systems. We estimate a structural random coefficients demand system which allows for complements (PCs and servers). Our estimates suggest that there were incentives to reduce interoperability which were particularly strong at the turn of the 21st Century.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Inseong Song & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, 2006. "Measuring Cross-Category Price Effects with Aggregate Store Data," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(10), pages 1594-1609, October.
- Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-890, July.
- Bernheim, B.D., 1992.
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1622, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002.
"The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," NBER Working Papers 6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steve Berry & Oliver B. Linton & Ariel Pakes, 2002.
"Limit Theorems for Estimating the Parameters of Differentiated Product Demand Systems,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1955, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Steve Berry & Oliver B. Linton & Ariel Pakes, 2004. "Limit Theorems for Estimating the Parameters of Differentiated Product Demand Systems," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 613-654.
- Steve Berry & Oliver Linton & Ariel Pakes, 2000. "Limit Theorems for Estimating the Parameters of Differentiated Product Demand Systems," STICERD - Econometrics Paper Series 400, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Steve Berry & Oliver Linton & Ariel Pakes, 2000. "Limit theorems for estimating the parameters of differentiated product demand systems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2032, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Steven Berry & Oliver Linton & Ariel Pakes, 2002. "Limit Theorems for Estimating the Parameters of Differentiated Product Demand Systems," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1372, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ernst R. Berndt & Neal J. Rappaport, 2001. "Price and Quality of Desktop and Mobile Personal Computers: A Quarter-Century Historical Overview," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 268-273, May.
- R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
- Bernard Reddy & David Evans & Albert Nichols & Richard Schmalensee, 2001. "A Monopolist Would Still Charge More for Windows: A Comment on Werden's Reply," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(3), pages 273-274, May.
- Jaison R. Abel & Ernst R. Berndt & Alan G. White, 2007. "Price Indexes for Microsoft," NBER Chapters, in: Hard-to-Measure Goods and Services: Essays in Honor of Zvi Griliches, pages 269-289 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003.
"A Primer on Foreclosure,"
IDEI Working Papers
203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
- Timothy F. Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, 1997.
"Technological Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry,"
97028, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F & Greenstein, Shane, 1999. "Technological Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 1-40, March.
- Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2009. "Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 8769.
- Bernard Reddy & David Evans & Albert Nichols & Richard Schmalensee, 2001. "A Monopolist Would Still Charge More for Windows: A Comment on Werden," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(3), pages 263-268, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.