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Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe

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  • Hamermesh, Daniel S.
  • Pfann, Gerard Antonie

Abstract

We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one’s peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual’s most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar’s most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamermesh, Daniel S. & Pfann, Gerard Antonie, 2009. "Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe," CEPR Discussion Papers 7603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7603
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matteo Migheli & Giovanni B. Ramello, 2014. "Open Access Journals & Academics’ Behaviour," ICER Working Papers 03-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    2. KRAPF, Matthias & SCHLÄPFER, Jörg, 2012. "How Nobel Laureates Would Perform In The Handelsblatt Ranking," Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 12(3).
    3. repec:spr:scient:v:84:y:2010:i:1:d:10.1007_s11192-009-0087-x is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Andrew J. Oswald, 2010. "A suggested method for the measurement of world-leading research (illustrated with data on economics)," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 84(1), pages 99-113, July.
    5. Glenn Ellison, 2013. "How Does the Market Use Citation Data? The Hirsch Index in Economics," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 63-90, July.
    6. Hofmeister Robert & Krapf Matthias, 2011. "How Do Editors Select Papers, and How Good are They at Doing It?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-23, October.
    7. Jinyoung Kim & Kanghyock Koh, 2014. "Incentives for Journal Editors," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 348-371, February.
    8. repec:spr:scient:v:98:y:2014:i:1:d:10.1007_s11192-013-1052-2 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mobility; quality/quantity trade-off; salary determination;

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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