Reputational Capital and Academic Pay
This article examines how research productivity, administrative service, and teaching affect reputational capital in the market for academic economists. Also, we investigate the issue of the durability of reputational capital, estimating the penalties associated with gaps in research output. Our results reveal that (1) the market makes a distinction between the quantity and the quality of an individual's research output, (2) a smaller number of frequently cited papers enhances reputational capital more than a greater number of less frequently cited papers, (3) reputational capital does not depreciate rapidly during research breaks, and (4) the market does not discount co-authored papers. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 39 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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