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Competition and the Social Cost of Regulation in the Postal Sector

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  • Martin Maegli
  • Christian Jaag

Abstract

Increased direct and indirect competition in the postal sector represents a great challenge to the traditional business model of postal operators. It is often put forward that regulatory institutions need to evolve in parallel and coherently with developments in the market place in order to allow postal operators cope with these challenges. Regulatory institutions are intended to remedy market failures and reduce transaction costs. However, they also cause governance costs, including costs resulting from distorted investment and innovation, if these institutions do not respond adequately to changes in consumer preferences and technologies. This paper analyzes of the impact of regulatory institutions on investment and innovation in the postal sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Maegli & Christian Jaag, 2012. "Competition and the Social Cost of Regulation in the Postal Sector," Working Papers 0032, Swiss Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:chc:wpaper:0032
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    File URL: http://www.swiss-economics.ch/RePEc/files/0032MaegliJaag.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christian Jaag & Florian Stahl & Benoit Stroelin, 2011. "Commercial and Regulatory Aspects of Reverse Hybrid Mail," Working Papers 0030, Swiss Economics.
    2. M. Maegli & C. Jaag & M. Finger, 2010. "Regulatory Governance Costs in Network Industries: Observations in Postal Regulation," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 11(2), pages 207-238, June.
    3. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    4. Dietl Helmut & Grütter Andreas & Lutzenberger Martin, 2008. "Deregulation of Letter Markets and its Impact on Process and Product Innovation," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-16, June.
    5. Martin Maegli & Christian Jaag & Matthias Finger, 2009. "Co?ts de la r?gulation des industries de r?seau: enseignements du r?seau postal," Working Papers 0015, Swiss Economics.
    6. Sven Heitzler & Christian Wey, 2010. "Raising Rivals' Fixed (Labor) Costs: The Deutsche Post Case," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1008, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Martin Maegli & Christian Jaag & Matthias Finger, 2009. "Coûts de la régulation des industries de réseaux : enseignements du réseau postal," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(3), pages 47-68.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Jaag & Martin Maegli, 2015. "Market Regulations and USO in the Revised Swiss Postal Act: Provisions and Authorities," Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, in: Michael A. Crew & Timothy J. Brennan (ed.), Postal and Delivery Innovation in the Digital Economy, edition 127, pages 301-311, Springer.
    2. Jaag, Christian, 2014. "Postal-sector policy: From monopoly to regulated competition and beyond," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 266-277.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Postal market; Governance; Institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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