Competition and the Social Cost of Regulation in the Postal Sector
Increased direct and indirect competition in the postal sector represents a great challenge to the traditional business model of postal operators. It is often put forward that regulatory institutions need to evolve in parallel and coherently with developments in the market place in order to allow postal operators cope with these challenges. Regulatory institutions are intended to remedy market failures and reduce transaction costs. However, they also cause governance costs, including costs resulting from distorted investment and innovation, if these institutions do not respond adequately to changes in consumer preferences and technologies. This paper analyzes of the impact of regulatory institutions on investment and innovation in the postal sector.
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- repec:cai:reidbu:rei_127_0047 is not listed on IDEAS
- M. Maegli & C. Jaag & M. Finger, 2010.
"Regulatory Governance Costs in Network Industries: Observations in Postal Regulation,"
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries,
Intersentia, vol. 11(2), pages 207-238, June.
- Martin Maegli & Christian Jaag & Matthias Finger, 2010. "Regulatory Governance Costs in Network Industries: Observations in Postal Regulation," Working Papers 0018, Swiss Economics.
- Christian Jaag & Florian Stahl & Benoit Stroelin, 2011. "Commercial and Regulatory Aspects of Reverse Hybrid Mail," Working Papers 0030, Swiss Economics.
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