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Coûts de la régulation des industries de réseaux : enseignements du réseau postal

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  • Martin Maegli
  • Christian Jaag
  • Matthias Finger

Abstract

An important role in the implementation of liberalization processes in network industries is attributed to regulation and thus to regulatory institutions. Regulation is intended to have positive effect on social welfare by correcting market failures. But state intervention also generate costs which we call costs of regulatory governance. These costs result from negative consequences caused by unnecessary regulatory requirements or from the implementation of inappropriate regulatory instruments. According to new institutional economics, these costs will depend upon the formal and informal rules among the involved actors, upon the allocation of property rights among these actors, as well as upon the various principal-agent or more generally contractual relationships among these actors. In this article we define an analytical framework of costs of regulatory governance. We distinguish between direct and indirect costs of regulation: direct costs are related to the institutional design of the regulatory framework and to the behavior of actors, whereas indirect costs arise because of false incentives and ultimately result in an inefficient supply of goods and services. Using the example of the Swiss postal market, we offer an outline of a possible application of the framework. In the present article we neither intend to quantify regulatory costs nor do we question regulation per se. Rather, we develop a framework which helps to structure a discussion about regulatory challenges in the network industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Maegli & Christian Jaag & Matthias Finger, 2009. "Coûts de la régulation des industries de réseaux : enseignements du réseau postal," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(3), pages 47-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_127_0047
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christian Jaag, 2007. "Liberalization of the Swiss Letter Market and the Viability of Universal Service Obligations," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 143(III), pages 261-282, September.
    2. Steven Tadelis & Oliver E.Williamson, 2012. "Transaction Cost Economics," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), : The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
    3. Philippe Donder, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(3), pages 307-326, May.
    4. Knieps, Günter, 2002. "Does the system of letter conveyance constitute a bottleneck resource?," Discussion Papers 88, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    5. De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector," IDEI Working Papers 319, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    6. Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2008. "Pricing in Competitive Two-Sided Mail Markets," Chapters,in: Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector, chapter 10 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    8. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, 1977. "Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
    9. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    10. Cohen, Wesley M. & Levin, Richard C., 1989. "Empirical studies of innovation and market structure," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 18, pages 1059-1107 Elsevier.
    11. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, October.
    12. Christian Jaag, 2007. "Innovation in the Swiss mail sector: deregulation versus liberalization," Working Papers 0009, Swiss Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Maegli & Christian Jaag, 2013. "Competition and the social cost of regulation in the postal sector," Chapters,in: Reforming the Postal Sector in the Face of Electronic Competition, chapter 20, pages 294-305 Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Postal Sector; Regulatory Governance Costs; New Institutional Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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