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Universal Service Auctions in Liberalized Postal Markets

  • Joan Calzada
  • Christian Jaag

    ()

  • Urs Trinkner

    ()

We analyze whether it makes sense to auction off Universal Service Obligations in postal markets. Based on auction theory, case studies and sector-specific considerations we conclude that auctions will be difficult to implement in the postal sector.

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File URL: http://www.swiss-economics.ch/RePEc/files/0014CalzadaJaagTrinkner.pdf
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Paper provided by Swiss Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0014.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision: Jul 2009
Publication status: Published in Heightening Competition in the Postal and Delivery Sector, edited by M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, pp. 263-277.
Handle: RePEc:chc:wpaper:0014
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.swiss-economics.ch
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  1. Panzar, John C., 2000. "A methodology for measuring the costs of universal service obligations," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 211-220, September.
  2. Borrmann Jörg, 2004. "Franchise Bidding for Postal Services in Rural Regions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-22, April.
  3. Harstad, Ronald M & Crew, Michael A, 1999. "Franchise Bidding without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 141-63, March.
  4. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
  6. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Documentos de Trabajo 37, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  7. Michael Klein, 1998. "Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11525, The World Bank.
  8. Mathisen, Terje Andreas & Solvoll, Gisle, 2008. "Competitive tendering and structural changes: An example from the bus industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, January.
  9. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. " The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-55, Summer.
  10. Sorana, Valter, 2000. "Auctions for Universal Service Subsidies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 33-58, July.
  11. C. Jaag & U. Trinkner, 2009. "Tendering Universal Service Obligations in Liberalized Network Industries," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 10(4), pages 313-333, December.
  12. Cox, James C & Isaac, R Mark, 1984. "In Search of the Winner's Curse," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 579-92, October.
  13. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
  14. David A. Hensher & Ian P. Wallis, 2005. "Competitive Tendering as a Contracting Mechanism for Subsidising Transport: The Bus Experience," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 39(3), pages 295-322, September.
  15. Peha, Jon M., 1999. "Tradable universal service obligations," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 363-374, June.
  16. del Sol, Patricio, 2002. "Responses to electricity liberalization: the regional strategy of a Chilean generator," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 437-446, April.
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