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Universal Service Auctions in Liberalized Postal Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Joan Calzada
  • Christian Jaag

    ()

  • Urs Trinkner

    ()

Abstract

We analyze whether it makes sense to auction off Universal Service Obligations in postal markets. Based on auction theory, case studies and sector-specific considerations we conclude that auctions will be difficult to implement in the postal sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Calzada & Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2009. "Universal Service Auctions in Liberalized Postal Markets," Working Papers 0014, Swiss Economics, revised Jul 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:chc:wpaper:0014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Sorana, Valter, 2000. "Auctions for Universal Service Subsidies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 33-58, July.
    6. C. Jaag & U. Trinkner, 2009. "Tendering Universal Service Obligations in Liberalized Network Industries," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 10(4), pages 313-333, December.
    7. Cox, James C & Isaac, R Mark, 1984. "In Search of the Winner's Curse," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 579-592, October.
    8. Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 993-1020, October.
    9. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. " The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
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    11. Borrmann Jörg, 2004. "Franchise Bidding for Postal Services in Rural Regions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-22, April.
    12. Mathisen, Terje Andreas & Solvoll, Gisle, 2008. "Competitive tendering and structural changes: An example from the bus industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Finger & Christian Jaag & Markus Lang & Martin Lutzenberger & Urs Trinkner, 2009. "Bestimmung des Regulierungsbedarfs aus ökonomischer Sicht: Angemessenheit und Folgen einer funktionalen oder strukturellen Trennung von Swisscom," Studies and Reports, Swiss Economics, pages 1-92, February.
    2. Christian Jaag & Martin Koller & Urs Trinkner, 2009. "Calculating the Cost of the Universal Service Obligation: The Need for a Global Approach," Chapters,in: Progress in the Competitive Agenda in the Postal and Delivery Sector, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Carlos Costa, 2012. "On the Use of Reverse Auctions to Designate Universal Postal Service Providers," Chapters,in: Multi-Modal Competition and the Future of Mail, chapter 21 Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procurement; Tendering; Reverse Auctions; Universal Service Obligation;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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