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Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply

Author

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  • Philipp Doerrenberg

    (University of Cologne)

  • Denvil Duncan

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

We examine the extent to which labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates depend on access to evasion opportunities. It is observed that some types of workers have the opportunity to hide their income while others do not have such opportunities, e.g. due to being subject to third-party-reporting. We first set up a theoretical model to formally show that labor supply responses depend on access to evasion. The model is then tested in a lab experiment in which all participants undertake a real-effort task over several rounds. Subjects face a tax rate, which varies across rounds and are required to pay taxes on earned income. The treatment group is given the opportunity to underreport income while the control group is not. We find zero labor effort responses to tax rates in the control group and positive statistically significant adjustments in the treatment group; suggesting that both groups indeed react differently to taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan, 2012. "Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-10, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgr:cgsser:03-10
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    3. Victoria Prowse & David Gill, 2009. "A Novel Computerized Real Effort Task Based on Sliders," Economics Series Working Papers 435, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Doerrenberg, Philipp, 2015. "Does the use of tax revenue matter for tax compliance behavior?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 30-34.
    5. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2014. "Tax Incidence in the Presence of Tax Evasion," IZA Discussion Papers 8137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. European Commission, 2013. "Tax reforms in EU Member States - Tax policy challenges for economic growth and fiscal sustainability – 2013 Report," Taxation Papers 38, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
    7. Kristoffer Berg & Thor O. Thoresen, 2020. "Problematic response margins in the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 721-752, June.
    8. Pietro Battiston & Denvil Duncan & Simona Gamba & Alessandro Santoro, 2016. "The Italian Blitz: a natural experiment on audit publicity and tax compliance," FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers 2016-10, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation.
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    11. Guerra, Alice & Harrington, Brooke, 2018. "Attitude–behavior consistency in tax compliance: A cross-national comparison," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 184-205.
    12. Gill, David & Prowse, Victoria, 2019. "Measuring costly effort using the slider task," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 1-9.
    13. Schröder, Melanie & Schmitt, Norma & Heynemann, Britta & Brünn, Claudia, 2013. "Income Taxation and Labor Supply: An Experiment on Couple's Work Effort," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79735, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2015. "Circumstantial risk: Impact of future tax evasion and labor supply opportunities on risk exposure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 85-100.
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    17. Grundmann, Susanna & Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2017. "How income and tax rates provoke cheating – An experimental investigation of tax morale," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 27-42.
    18. Kessler, Judd B. & Norton, Michael I., 2016. "Tax aversion in labor supply," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 15-28.
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    20. Tomoharu Mori & Hirofumi Kurokawa & Fumio Ohtake, 2020. "Labor supply reaction to wage cuts and tax increases: A real-effort experiment," ISER Discussion Paper 1100, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    21. Schröder, Melanie & Schmitt, Norma & Mantei, Britta & Brünn, Claudia, 2014. "Social Norms or Income Taxation - What Drives Couple's Labor Supply? Experimental Evidence," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100375, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    22. Melanie Schröder & Norma Burow, 2016. "Couple's Labor Supply, Taxes, and the Division of Housework in a Gender-Neutral Lab," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1593, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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    Keywords

    Tax Evasion; Labor Supply; Taxable Income; Lab Experiment; Taxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor

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