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Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply

Author Info

  • Philipp Doerrenberg

    (University of Cologne)

  • Denvil Duncan

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

We examine the extent to which labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates depend on access to evasion opportunities. It is observed that some types of workers have the opportunity to hide their income while others do not have such opportunities, e.g. due to being subject to third-party-reporting. We first set up a theoretical model to formally show that labor supply responses depend on access to evasion. The model is then tested in a lab experiment in which all participants undertake a real-effort task over several rounds. Subjects face a tax rate, which varies across rounds and are required to pay taxes on earned income. The treatment group is given the opportunity to underreport income while the control group is not. We find zero labor effort responses to tax rates in the control group and positive statistically significant adjustments in the treatment group; suggesting that both groups indeed react differently to taxes.

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Paper provided by Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences in its series Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series with number 03-10.

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Date of creation: 18 Sep 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cgr:cgsser:03-10
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Keywords: Tax Evasion; Labor Supply; Taxable Income; Lab Experiment; Taxes;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
  • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor

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Cited by:

  1. Schröder, Melanie & Schmitt, Norma & Heynemann, Britta & Brünn, Claudia, 2013. "Income Taxation and Labor Supply: An Experiment on Couple's Work Effort," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79735, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Melanie Schröder & Norma Burow, 2016. "Couple's Labor Supply, Taxes, and the Division of Housework in a Gender-Neutral Lab," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1593, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  3. Felipe Augusto de Araujo & Erin Carbone & Lynn Conell-Price & Marli W. Dunietz & Ania Jaroszewicz & Rachel Landsman & Diego Lamé & Lise Vesterlund & Stephanie Wang & Alistair J. Wilson, 2015. "The Effect of Incentives on Real Effort: Evidence from the Slider Task," CESifo Working Paper Series 5372, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Gill, David & Prowse, Victoria L., 2011. "A Novel Computerized Real Effort Task Based on Sliders," IZA Discussion Papers 5801, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2014. "Tax Incidence in the Presence of Tax Evasion," IZA Discussion Papers 8137, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. European Commission, 2013. "Tax reforms in EU Member States - Tax policy challenges for economic growth and fiscal sustainability – 2013 Report," Taxation Papers 38, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
  7. Schröder, Melanie & Schmitt, Norma & Mantei, Britta & Brünn, Claudia, 2014. "Social Norms or Income Taxation - What Drives Couple's Labor Supply? Experimental Evidence," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100375, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  8. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2014. "Circumstantial Risk: Impact of Future Tax Evasion and Labor Supply Opportunities on Risk Exposure," IZA Discussion Papers 7917, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Koch, Christian & Müller, Cornelius, 2015. "Anticipated Tax Amnesties and Tax Compliance: An Experimental Study," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112991, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  10. Doerrenberg, Philipp, 2015. "Does the use of tax revenue matter for tax compliance behavior?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 30-34.
  11. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  12. Kessler, Judd B. & Norton, Michael I., 2016. "Tax aversion in labor supply," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 15-28.

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