Electoral Competition and Corruption: Theory and Evidence from India
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References listed on IDEAS
- Aidt, T. & Golden, M. A. & Tiwari, D., 2011. "Incumbents and Criminals in the Indian National Legislature," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1157, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; Electoral Competition; Audit; Accountability; Moral Hazard. JEL Classification: D72; D82; H75; O43; C72.;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2019-06-24 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-CDM-2019-06-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2019-06-24 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2019-06-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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