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Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption

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  • Banerjee, Abhijit
  • Pande, Rohini

Abstract

This paper examines how increased voter ethnicization, defined as a greater preference for the party representing one's ethnic group, affects politician quality. If politics is characterized by incomplete policy commitment, then ethnicization reduces average winner quality for the pro-majority party with the opposite true for the minority party. The effect increases with greater numerical dominance of the majority (and so social homogeneity). Empirical evidence from a survey on politician corruption that we conducted in North India is remarkably consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Abhijit & Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption," CEPR Discussion Papers 6381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6381
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Isaksson, Ann-Sofie & Bigsten, Arne, 2014. "Clientelism and ethnic divisions," Working Papers in Economics 598, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    3. Andrew Beath & Fotini Christia & Georgy Egorov & Ruben Enikolopov, 2016. "Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 932-968.
    4. Monojit Chatterji & Sushil Mohan & Sayantan Ghosh Dastidar, 2015. "Determinants of public education expenditure: evidence from Indian states," International Journal of Education Economics and Development, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(1), pages 1-19.
    5. Sitakanta Panda, 2015. "Political Connections and Elite Capture in a Poverty Alleviation Programme in India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 50-65, January.
    6. Gerard Padro i Miquel & Nancy Qian & Yang Yao, 2012. "Social Fragmentation, Public Goods and Elections: Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 18633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2013. "Networks, Commitment, and Competence: Caste in Indian Local Politics," NBER Working Papers 19197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Das, Sabyasachi & Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop & Saroy, Rajas, 2017. "Efficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics: Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 11093, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Sitakanta Panda, 2012. "Legislator characteristics and legislative outcomes in India," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3401-3416.
    10. repec:ecl:stabus:2099 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Dube, Partha Pratim & Gangopadhyay, Partha, 2015. "MGNREGA policies and deterrence of development in rural India: An analytical approach," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 5(2), pages 101-113.
    12. Andrzej Kwiatkowski, 2013. "Education investment effects of affirmative action policy. Contest game argument," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 279, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    13. William Easterly, 2009. "Can the West Save Africa?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 373-447, June.
    14. Federico Revelli, 2016. "Tax limits and local elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 53-68, January.
    15. repec:bla:obuest:v:79:y:2017:i:3:p:291-318 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Ann-Sofie Isaksson, 2015. "Corruption Along Ethnic Lines: A Study of Individual Corruption Experiences in 17 African Countries," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 80-92, January.
    17. Andrew Beath & Fotini Christia & Georgy Egorov & Ruben Enikolopov, 2014. "Electoral Rules and the Quality of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," NBER Working Papers 20082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Awaworyi Churchill, Sefa & Nuhu, Ahmed Salim, 2015. "Ethnic Diversity and Educational Attainment," EconStor Conference Papers 125567, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    19. Simplice Asongu & Oasis Kodila-Tedika, 2015. "Tribalism and Financial Development," Working Papers 15/018, African Governance and Development Institute..
    20. Mitra, Anirban, 2015. "Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution," MPRA Paper 67004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Marie-Anne Valfort, 2007. "Containing ethnic conflicts through ethical voting? Evidence from Ethiopia," HiCN Working Papers 35, Households in Conflict Network.
    22. Siwan Anderson & Patrick Francois & Ashok Kotwal, 2012. "One Kind of Democracy," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 12/292, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    23. Catalina Tejada & Eliana Ferrara & Henrik Kleven & Florian Blum & Oriana Bandiera & Michel Azulai, 2015. "State Effectiveness, Growth, and Development," Working Papers id:6668, eSocialSciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Ethnic Voting; India;

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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