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The Effect of Network Degree on Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from the Field

Author

Listed:
  • Ben D'Exelle
  • Christine Gutekunst
  • Arno Riedl

Abstract

We conduct an artefactual field experiment in real-existing trade networks to analyze how individual network degree affects bargaining demands and outcomes. We combine data from a bilateral bargaining experiment with data of trade networks in 24 villages in Uganda. To identify the effect of individual degree in the village trade network we experimentally vary the disclosure of participants’ identities in a bargaining pair. We derive hypotheses on how degree should affect behavior and find partial support for them. Specifically, we observe that individual degree affects bargaining demands in the predicted direction when one of the bargainers is informed about the network positions but not when both sides are informed. Moreover, network degree affects the likelihood of agreements and earnings, irrespective of the knowledge of the network positions of bargaining partners.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben D'Exelle & Christine Gutekunst & Arno Riedl, 2025. "The Effect of Network Degree on Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from the Field," CESifo Working Paper Series 11832, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11832
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; social networks; network degree; experiments.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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