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Oligopolistic competition and welfare

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  • Ritz, Robert

Abstract

This chapter provides a selective survey of recent developments in the study of social welfare under oligopoly. The main topics covered are (i) the rate of cost pass through as a tool to analyze market performance; (ii) the quantification of welfare losses due to market power in Cournot-style models; and (iii) new results from models with endogenous entry. The chapter highlights common themes across these topics and identi.es areas for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Ritz, Robert, 2016. "Oligopolistic competition and welfare," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1680, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1680
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    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1680.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Takanori Adachi & Michal Fabinger, 2017. "Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through, Incidence, and the Welfare Burden of Taxation in Oligopoly," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1040, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and industrial organization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 511-517.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monopoly; oligopoly; allocative efficiency; firm behaviour; antitrust policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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