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Using Cost Pass-Through to Calibrate Demand

Author

Listed:
  • Nathan H. Miller

    (Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice)

  • Marc Remer

    (Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice)

  • Gloria Sheu

    (Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice)

Abstract

We demonstrate that cost pass-through can be used to inform demand calibration, potentially eliminating the need for data on margins, diversion, or both. We derive the relationship between cost pass-through and consumer demand using a general oligopoly model of Nash-Bertrand competition and develop specic results for four demand systems: linear demand, logit demand, the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), and log-linear demand. The methods we propose may be useful to researchers and antitrust authorities when reliable measures of margins or diversion are unavailable.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan H. Miller & Marc Remer & Gloria Sheu, 2012. "Using Cost Pass-Through to Calibrate Demand," EAG Discussions Papers 201209, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    • Handle: RePEc:doj:eagpap:201209
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    File URL: https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/288257a.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    2. Nathan H. Miller & Conor Ryan & Marc Remer & Gloria Sheu, 2012. "Approximating the Price Effects of Mergers: Numerical Evidence and an Empirical Application," EAG Discussions Papers 201208, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    3. Deaton, Angus S & Muellbauer, John, 1980. "An Almost Ideal Demand System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 312-326, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jéssica Dutra & Tarun Sabarwal, 2020. "Antitrust analysis with upward pricing pressure and cost efficiencies," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-31, January.
    2. Nathan H. Miller & Marc Remer & Conor Ryan & Gloria Sheu, 2016. "Pass-Through and the Prediction of Merger Price Effects," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 683-709, December.
    3. Robert A. Ritz, 2018. "Oligopolistic competition and welfare," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 7, pages 181-200, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Paul S. Koh, 2024. "Merger Analysis with Latent Price," Papers 2404.07684, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
    5. Takanori Adachi & Michal Fabinger, 2017. "Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through, Incidence, and the Welfare Burden of Taxation in Oligopoly," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1040, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    6. MacKay, Alexander & Miller, Nathan H. & Remer, Marc & Sheu, Gloria, 2014. "Bias in reduced-form estimates of pass-through," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 200-202.
    7. Takanori Adachi & Muhammad Michal Fabinger, 2017. "Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through, Incidence, and the Welfare Burden of Taxation in Oligopoly," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1040, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    8. Erich Muehlegger & Richard L. Sweeney, 2017. "Pass-Through of Own and Rival Cost Shocks: Evidence from the U.S. Fracking Boom," NBER Working Papers 24025, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Takanori Adachi & Michal Fabinger, 2017. "Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through and Welfare Measures under Imperfect Competition," Papers 1702.04967, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2018.
    10. E. Glen Weyl & Michal Fabinger, 2013. "Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 528-583.
    11. Miller, Nathan H. & Remer, Marc & Ryan, Conor & Sheu, Gloria, 2017. "Upward pricing pressure as a predictor of merger price effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 216-247.
    12. Jessica Dutra & Tarun Sabarwal, 2018. "Cost Efficiencies and Upward Pricing Pressure," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201901, University of Kansas, Department of Economics.
    13. Duso, Tomaso & Szücs, Florian, 2017. "Market power and heterogeneous pass-through in German electricity retail," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 354-372.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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