IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/15387.html

Unpriced Diversification in US Crop Insurance

In: Risk and Risk Management in the Agricultural Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvia Klosin
  • Adam Solomon

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvia Klosin & Adam Solomon, 2026. "Unpriced Diversification in US Crop Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Risk and Risk Management in the Agricultural Economy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:15387
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c15387.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moshe A. Milevsky & Vladyslav Kyrychenko, 2008. "Portfolio Choice with Puts: Evidence from Variable Annuities," Financial Analysts Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 64(3), pages 80-95, May.
    2. Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, 2019. "Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(2), pages 473-522, February.
    3. Hans P. Binswanger, 1980. "Attitudes Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 62(3), pages 395-407.
    4. Francis Annan & Wolfram Schlenker, 2015. "Federal Crop Insurance and the Disincentive to Adapt to Extreme Heat," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 262-266, May.
    5. Jesse B. Tack & Matthew T. Holt, 2016. "The influence of weather extremes on the spatial correlation of corn yields," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 299-309, January.
    6. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. Acharya, Viral V. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, January.
    8. Bryan Kelly & Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2016. "Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply about Sector-Wide Government Guarantees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(6), pages 1278-1319, June.
    9. Chetty, Raj, 2006. "A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1879-1901, November.
    10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    11. John M. Antle, 1987. "Econometric Estimation of Producers' Risk Attitudes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(3), pages 509-522.
    12. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:6:p:2531-2575 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Ashesh Rambachan & Jonathan Roth, 2023. "A More Credible Approach to Parallel Trends," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(5), pages 2555-2591.
    14. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
    15. Mark Shepard, 2022. "Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 578-615, February.
    16. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    18. Saunders, Anthony & Strock, Elizabeth & Travlos, Nickolaos G, 1990. "Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 643-654, June.
    19. Sun, Liyang & Abraham, Sarah, 2021. "Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 175-199.
    20. Vincent H. Smith & Barry K. Goodwin, 1996. "Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural Chemical Use," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(2), pages 428-438.
    21. John, Kose & Saunders, Anthony & Senbet, Lemma W, 2000. "A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 95-125.
    22. Michael Breuer, 2005. "Multiple Losses, EX ANTE Moral Hazard, and the Implications for Umbrella Policies," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(4), pages 525-538, December.
    23. Marshall Burke & Kyle Emerick, 2016. "Adaptation to Climate Change: Evidence from US Agriculture," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 106-140, August.
    24. Parlour, Christine A. & Winton, Andrew, 2013. "Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 25-45.
    25. Erik J. O’Donoghue & Michael J. Roberts & Nigel Key, 2009. "Did the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act Alter Farm Enterprise Diversification?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 80-104, February.
    26. Marco Scarsini, 1988. "Multivariate stochastic dominance with fixed dependence structure," Post-Print hal-00542234, HAL.
    27. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 651-666.
    28. Viral Acharya & Itamar Drechsler & Philipp Schnabl, 2014. "A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2689-2739, December.
    29. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
    30. Kukal, M.S. & Irmak, S., 2020. "Impact of irrigation on interannual variability in United States agricultural productivity," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    31. Reint Gropp & Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2011. "Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2084-2120.
    32. George Baker, 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 728-751.
    33. Z. Bar‐Shira & R.E. Just & D. Zilberman, 1997. "Estimation of farmers' risk attitude: an econometric approach," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 17(2-3), pages 211-222, December.
    34. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    35. Michael Geruso & Timothy Layton & Daniel Prinz, 2019. "Screening in Contract Design: Evidence from the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 64-107, May.
    36. Tatyana Deryugina & Barrett Kirwan, 2018. "Does The Samaritan'S Dilemma Matter? Evidence From U.S. Agriculture," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 983-1006, April.
    37. Alan D. Morrison, 2005. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 621-648, March.
    38. Luisa Menapace & Gregory Colson & Roberta Raffaelli, 2013. "Risk Aversion, Subjective Beliefs, and Farmer Risk Management Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(2), pages 384-389.
    39. Victoria R. Marone & Adrienne Sabety, 2022. "When Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(1), pages 304-342, January.
    40. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    41. John, Kose & John, Teresa A. & Senbet, Lemma W., 1991. "Risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions: A new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 895-915, September.
    42. Alessio Saretto & Heather E. Tookes, 2013. "Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Credit Supply: The Role of Credit Default Swaps," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(5), pages 1190-1247.
    43. Raviv, Artur, 1979. "The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 84-96, March.
    44. Kurt Lavetti & Kosali Simon, 2018. "Strategic Formulary Design in Medicare Part D Plans," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 154-192, August.
    45. Harun Bulut, 2020. "The impact of enterprise unit policy change on the quantity demanded for crop insurance," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 80(4), pages 507-527, March.
    46. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
    47. Bernadette Minton & René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 2009. "How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 35(1), pages 1-31, February.
    48. Bruce J. Sherrick & Fabio C. Zanini & Gary D. Schnitkey & Scott H. Irwin, 2004. "Crop Insurance Valuation under Alternative Yield Distributions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(2), pages 406-419.
    49. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    50. Zulauf, Carl & Schnitkey, Gary & Swanson, Krista & Paulson, Nick & Coppess, Jonathan, . "Effective Reference Price – Past and Future," farmdoc daily, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, vol. 12(97).
    51. Cornaggia, Jess, 2013. "Does risk management matter? Evidence from the U.S. agricultural industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 419-440.
    52. Lee, Hangsuck & Lee, Minha & Hong, Jimin, 2022. "Optimal insurance under moral hazard in loss reduction," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    53. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    54. Hangsuck Lee & Minha Lee & Jimin Hong, 2024. "Optimal insurance for repetitive natural disasters under moral hazard," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 247-277, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Viral V. Acharya & Hamid Mehran & Anjan V. Thakor, 2016. "Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There Is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(1), pages 36-75.
    2. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Söhnke M Bartram & Jennifer Conrad & Jongsub Lee & Marti G Subrahmanyam, 2022. "Credit Default Swaps around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(5), pages 2464-2524.
    4. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69, October.
    5. Carolyn J. Heinrich & Gerald Marschke, 2010. "Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 183-208.
    6. Albuquerque, Ana & Carter, Mary Ellen & Guo, Zhe (Michael) & Lynch, Luann J., 2025. "Complexity of CEO compensation packages," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1).
    7. Acharya, Viral V. & Gündüz, Yalin & Johnson, Timothy C., 2022. "Bank use of sovereign CDS in the Eurozone crisis: Hedging and risk incentives," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    8. Jeong-Bon Kim & Li Li & Mary L. Z. Ma & Frank M. Song, 2013. "CEO Option Compensation, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry," Working Papers 182013, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    9. Robert Gibbons, 2005. "Incentives Between Firms (and Within)," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 2-17, January.
    10. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    11. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
    13. Hangsuck Lee & Minha Lee & Jimin Hong, 2024. "Optimal insurance for repetitive natural disasters under moral hazard," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 247-277, December.
    14. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
    15. Jenter, Dirk, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk," Working papers 4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    16. Castiglionesi, Fabio & Zhao, Shuo, 2024. "Banks incentive pay, diversification and systemic risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    17. Martin, Xiumin & Roychowdhury, Sugata, 2015. "Do financial market developments influence accounting practices? Credit default swaps and borrowers׳ reporting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 80-104.
    18. Daniel Streitz, 2016. "The Impact of Credit Default Swap Trading on Loan Syndication," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(1), pages 265-286.
    19. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2008. "Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 565-585, June.
    20. Tomasz Obloj & Peter Zemsky, 2015. "Value creation and value capture under moral hazard: Exploring the micro-foundations of buyer– supplier relationships," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(8), pages 1146-1163, August.
    21. Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996. "Limited intertemporal commitment and job design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
    22. Marisetty, Vijaya B. & Shoeb, Md, 2024. "Capital infusions and Bank risk-taking behaviour," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:15387. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.