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Susan Kathryn Snyder

Personal Details

First Name:Susan
Middle Name:Kathryn
Last Name:Snyder
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psn1
651 431 2947
Terminal Degree:1995 (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Human Services
Government of Minnesota

St.Paul, Minnesota (United States)
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/



444 Lafayette Road, Saint Paul, MN 55155-3838
RePEc:edi:dhmngus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Susan Snyder & Indrajit Ray, 2004. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 407, Econometric Society.

Articles

  1. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
  2. Susan K. Snyder, 2004. "Scientific Progress and Lessons for Institutional Design," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 183-187, January.
  3. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
  4. Snyder, Susan K., 2004. "Observable implications of equilibrium behavior on finite data," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 165-176, February.
  5. Snyder, Susan K & Weingast, Barry R, 2000. "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 269-305, October.
  6. Susan K. Snyder, 2000. "Nonparametric Testable Restrictions of Household Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 171-185, July.
  7. Snyder, Susan K., 1999. "Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 97-119, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Susan Snyder & Indrajit Ray, 2004. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 407, Econometric Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2017. "Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 563-567.
    2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2005. "Learning From a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," THEMA Working Papers 2006-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    3. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2013. "Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2521-2534, November.
    4. Lee, Byung Soo & Stewart, Colin, 2016. "Identification of payoffs in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 82-88.

Articles

  1. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Carvajal, Andrés & González, Natalia, 2014. "On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 177-186.
    2. Cherchye, Laurens & De Rock, Bram & Vermeulen, Frederic, 2010. "An Afriat Theorem for the collective model of household consumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1142-1163, May.
    3. Andrés Carvajal & Alvaro Riascos, 2005. "The Identification Of Preferences From Market Data Under Uncertainty," Documentos CEDE 003599, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
    4. Ruediger Bachmann, 2006. "Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 489-504, November.
    5. Robert R. Routledge, 2009. "Testable implications of the Bertrand model," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0918, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    6. Bachmann, Ruediger, 2006. "Testable implications of coalitional rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 101-105, October.
    7. Andrés Carvajal & John Quah, 2009. "A Nonparametric Analysis of the Cournot Model," Economics Papers 2009-W15, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    8. Donald J. Brown & Ravi Kannan, 2006. "Two Algorithms for Solving the Walrasian Equilibrium Inequalities," Working Papers 945, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    9. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2005. "Learning From a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," THEMA Working Papers 2006-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    10. Cherchye, Laurens & Demuynck, Thomas & De Rock, Bram, 2011. "Testable implications of general equilibrium models: An integer programming approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 564-575.
    11. Schwarz, Christian & Stroinski, Uwe, 2009. "Is there a Walrasian Equilibrium in Exchange Markets with Endowment Effect?," Ruhr Economic Papers 82, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    12. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
    13. Bart Smeulders & Laurens Cherchye & Bram Rock & Frits C. R. Spieksma & Fabrice Talla Nobibon, 2015. "Transitive preferences in multi-member households," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 243-254, October.
    14. Ian Crawford & Bram De Rock, 2013. "Empirical Revealed Preference," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-32, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    15. Donald J. Brown & Caterina Calsamiglia, 2005. "The Nonparametric Approach to Applied Welfare Analysis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1507, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. W D A Bryant, 2009. "General Equilibrium:Theory and Evidence," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 6875, February.
    17. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2011. "Falsifiability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 788-818, April.
    18. Fabrice Talla Nobibon & Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Jeroen Sabbe & Frits Spieksma, 2011. "Heuristics for Deciding Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 38(2), pages 173-204, August.
    19. Federico Echenique, 2019. "New developments in revealed preference theory: decisions under risk, uncertainty, and intertemporal choice," Papers 1908.07561, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2019.
    20. Brown, Donald J. & Kannan, Ravi, 2006. "Two Algorithms for Solving the Walrasian Equilibrium Inequalities," Center Discussion Papers 28443, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    21. Galambos, Adam, 2019. "Descriptive complexity and revealed preference theory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 54-64.
    22. Paul Oslington, 2012. "General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 446-448, September.
    23. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Falsifiability," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    24. Snyder, Susan K., 2004. "Observable implications of equilibrium behavior on finite data," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 165-176, February.

  3. Snyder, Susan K., 2004. "Observable implications of equilibrium behavior on finite data," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 165-176, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Bart Smeulders & Laurens Cherchye & Bram Rock & Frits C. R. Spieksma & Fabrice Talla Nobibon, 2015. "Transitive preferences in multi-member households," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 243-254, October.
    2. W D A Bryant, 2009. "General Equilibrium:Theory and Evidence," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 6875, February.
    3. Balasko, Yves & Tvede, Mich, 2009. "The geometry of finite equilibrium datasets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(5-6), pages 391-396, May.
    4. Yves Balasko & Mich Tvede, "undated". "Equilibrium Data Sets and Compatible Utility Rankings," Discussion Papers 05-23, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
    5. Paul Oslington, 2012. "General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 446-448, September.

  4. Snyder, Susan K & Weingast, Barry R, 2000. "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 269-305, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Krehbiel, Kieth, 2006. "Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game," Research Papers 1942, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Christopher J. Waller, 1998. "Appointing the median voter of a policy board," Working Papers (Old Series) 9802, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    3. Brian Goff, 2010. "Do differences in presidential economic advisers matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 279-291, March.
    4. David M. Primo & Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, 2008. "Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 471-489, July.
    5. Adam R. Fremeth & Guy L. F. Holburn & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, 2016. "Corporate Political Strategy in Contested Regulatory Environments," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(4), pages 272-284, December.
    6. Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Yannis Karagiannis, 2007. "Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations," RSCAS Working Papers 2007/04, European University Institute.

  5. Susan K. Snyder, 2000. "Nonparametric Testable Restrictions of Household Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 171-185, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Casey B. Mulligan, 2018. "Quantifier Elimination for Deduction in Econometrics," NBER Working Papers 24601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Smeulders, Bart & Crama, Yves & Spieksma, Frits C.R., 2019. "Revealed preference theory: An algorithmic outlook," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 272(3), pages 803-815.
    3. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
    4. Cherchye, Laurens & De Rock, Bram & Vermeulen, Frederic, 2005. "Opening the Black Box of Intra-Household Decision-Making: Theory and Non-Parametric Empirical Tests of General Collective Consumption Models," IZA Discussion Papers 1603, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Laurens Cherchye & Frederic Vermeulen, 2008. "Nonparametric Analysis of Household Labor Supply: Goodness of Fit and Power of the Unitary and the Collective Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(2), pages 267-274, May.
    6. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Casey B. Mulligan, 2016. "Automated Economic Reasoning with Quantifier Elimination," NBER Working Papers 22922, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  6. Snyder, Susan K., 1999. "Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 97-119, January.

    Cited by:

    1. J. D. Geanakoplos & H. M. Polemarchakis, 2006. "Pareto Improving Taxes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1576, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Andrés Carvajal, 2003. "Testable Restrictions of General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities," Borradores de Economia 231, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    3. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
    4. Cherchye, Laurens & Demuynck, Thomas & De Rock, Bram, 2011. "Testable implications of general equilibrium models: An integer programming approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 564-575.
    5. Andrés Carvajal, 2010. "The testable implications of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 349-378, October.
    6. Schwarz, Christian & Stroinski, Uwe, 2009. "Is there a Walrasian Equilibrium in Exchange Markets with Endowment Effect?," Ruhr Economic Papers 82, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Carvajal, Andrés & Song, Xinxi, 2018. "Testing Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium in economies with public goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 19-30.
    8. Laurens Cherchye & Bruno De Borger & Tom Van Puyenbroeck, 2004. "Nonparametric tests of optimizing behavior in public service provision: Methodology and an application to local safety," Public Economics Working Paper Series ces0416, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics.
    9. Deb, Rahul, 2009. "A testable model of consumption with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1804-1816, July.
    10. Bachmann, Ruediger, 2004. "Rationalizing allocation data--a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 271-295, June.
    11. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Chiappori, P. -A. & Ekeland, I. & Kubler, F. & Polemarchakis, H. M., 2004. "Testable implications of general equilibrium theory: a differentiable approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 105-119, February.
    13. Jean-Sébastien Lenfant, 2011. "General equilibrium after Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu: Trends and perspectives [L'équilibre général depuis Sonnenschein, Mantel et Debreu : courants et perspectives]," Post-Print hal-01742978, HAL.
    14. Francesco Ruscitti, 2013. "Provision of a discrete public good with infinitely-many commodities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 28-34.

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