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A. Mitchell Polinsky

Personal Details

First Name:A. Mitchell
Middle Name:
Last Name:Polinsky
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppo94

Affiliation

Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
Stanford University

Stanford, California (United States)
http://siepr.stanford.edu/
RePEc:edi:cestaus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters Books Editorship

Working papers

  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2019. "Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 26083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2017. "Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence," NBER Working Papers 23026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Paul N. Riskind, 2017. "Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation," NBER Working Papers 23436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2017. "Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered," NBER Working Papers 23303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2015. "Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior," Discussion Papers 15-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  6. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2012. "Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages," NBER Working Papers 18594, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006. "Public Enforcement of Law," Discussion Papers 05-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  8. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2006. "The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price Overcharges," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6943s2kd, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006. "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks," NBER Working Papers 12776, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Law," Discussion Papers 05-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  11. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies," NBER Working Papers 11227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 11780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable," NBER Working Papers 10761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," NBER Working Papers 10760, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts," NBER Working Papers 10162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2001. "A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2vz8x310, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  17. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2kz8r3j1, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  18. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1997. "On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence," NBER Working Papers 6259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1993. "Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs," NBER Working Papers 4507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1993. "Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?," NBER Working Papers 4586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1992. "Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges," NBER Working Papers 4176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," NBER Working Papers 3634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1991. "A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders," NBER Working Papers 3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1990. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 3232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1990. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," NBER Working Papers 3429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1987. "Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect," NBER Working Papers 2174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1986. "Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," NBER Working Papers 1817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1986. "A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs," NBER Working Papers 2114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1986. "Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 1846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1986. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability," NBER Working Papers 1834, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1982. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," NBER Working Papers 0937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  34. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1982. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 0932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  35. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1981. "Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies," NBER Working Papers 0714, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1981. "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs," NBER Working Papers 0742, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1980. "Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting," NBER Working Papers 0420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1980. "Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies," NBER Working Papers 0463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  39. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines," NBER Working Papers 0338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  40. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1978. "On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 0286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Articles

  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2017. "Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 391-422.
  2. Mitchell Polinsky, A., 2015. "Deterrence and the optimality of rewarding prisoners for good behavior," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-7.
  3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2014. "Costly litigation and optimal damages," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 86-89.
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2012. "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 360-379.
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2008. "The Deadweight Loss Of Coupon Remedies For Price Overcharges," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 402-417, June.
  6. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, September.
  7. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 823-835, May.
  8. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
  9. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2002. "A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 217-225, August.
  10. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
  11. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  12. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1999. "On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, January.
  13. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
  14. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1998. "Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 141-157, January.
  15. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1997. "Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 663-677, June.
  16. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1996. "Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 269-280, Summer.
  17. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1993. "Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 239-257, September.
  18. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-148, April.
  19. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1991. "A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 291-306, December.
  20. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
  21. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1991. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 618-621, June.
  22. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
  23. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-164, January.
  24. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1988. "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-116, June.
  25. Mitchell Polinsky, A., 1987. "Optimal liability when the injurer's information about the victim's loss is imperfect," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 139-147, December.
  26. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1987. "Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 27-46, Spring.
  27. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June.
  28. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
  29. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Shavell, Steven, 1982. "Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 385-394, December.
  30. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1980. "On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 233-246, April.
  31. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1980. "Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(2), pages 363-367, May.
  32. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 1980. "The efficiency of paying compensation in the Pigovian solution to externality problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 142-148, June.
  33. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Ellwood, David T, 1979. "An Empirical Reconciliation of Micro and Grouped Estimates of the Demand for Housing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 61(2), pages 199-205, May.
  34. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
  35. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(1), pages 75-83, February.
  36. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1979. "The Demand for Housing: An Empirical Postscript," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 521-523, March.
  37. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1978. "The long-run effects of a residential property tax and local public services," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 241-262, April.
  38. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1978. "Economics and Law: Discussion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 435-436, May.
  39. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1978. "Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area : A reply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 111-112, February.
  40. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1977. "The Demand for Housing: A Study in Specification and Grouping," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 447-461, March.
  41. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Shavell, Steven, 1976. "Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 119-129.
  42. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1975. "The Air Pollution and Property Value Debate," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 57(1), pages 100-104, February.
  43. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1972. "Probabilistic Compensation Criteria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 86(3), pages 407-425.

Chapters

  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2009. "Punitive Damages," Chapters, in: Michael Faure (ed.), Tort Law and Economics, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2009. "Public Enforcement of Law," Chapters, in: Nuno Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "Preface," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages xi-xii, Elsevier.
  4. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.

Books

  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.

Editorship

  1. Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
  2. Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
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  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
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  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  7. Number of Citations
  8. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  18. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  19. h-index
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  21. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
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  26. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  27. Euclidian citation score
  28. Breadth of citations across fields
  29. Wu-Index

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 15 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (12) 2004-01-12 2004-09-30 2005-04-03 2005-12-01 2007-01-02 2012-12-15 2012-12-22 2015-06-20 2017-01-15 2017-04-23 2017-06-04 2019-09-02. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 1999-02-15 2003-12-14 2004-01-12 2012-12-15 2019-09-02. Author is listed
  3. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (3) 1999-03-08 2005-12-01 2007-01-02
  4. NEP-REG: Regulation (3) 2005-12-01 2007-01-02 2012-12-15
  5. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1999-02-15
  6. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2017-04-23
  7. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (1) 2017-06-04
  8. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (1) 2017-04-23
  9. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (1) 2017-01-15
  10. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2019-09-02

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