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A. Mitchell Polinsky

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First Name:A. Mitchell
Middle Name:
Last Name:Polinsky
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RePEc Short-ID:ppo94
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Location: Stanford, California (United States)
Homepage: http://siepr.stanford.edu/
Email:
Phone: (650) 725-1874
Fax: (650) 723-8611
Postal: 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, California 94305-6015
Handle: RePEc:edi:cestaus (more details at EDIRC)
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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2012. "Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages," NBER Working Papers 18594, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006. "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks," NBER Working Papers 12776, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006. "Public Enforcement of Law," Discussion Papers 05-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Law," Discussion Papers 05-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 11780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies," NBER Working Papers 11227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable," NBER Working Papers 10761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," NBER Working Papers 10760, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts," NBER Working Papers 10162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1997. "On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence," NBER Working Papers 6259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1993. "Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?," NBER Working Papers 4586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1993. "Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs," NBER Working Papers 4507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1992. "Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges," NBER Working Papers 4176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," NBER Working Papers 3634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1991. "A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders," NBER Working Papers 3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1990. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," NBER Working Papers 3429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1990. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 3232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1987. "Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect," NBER Working Papers 2174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1986. "A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs," NBER Working Papers 2114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1986. "Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 1846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1986. "Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," NBER Working Papers 1817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1986. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability," NBER Working Papers 1834, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1982. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," NBER Working Papers 0937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1982. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 0932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1981. "Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies," NBER Working Papers 0714, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1981. "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs," NBER Working Papers 0742, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1980. "Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies," NBER Working Papers 0463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1980. "Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting," NBER Working Papers 0420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines," NBER Working Papers 0338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1978. "On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 0286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2008. "THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF COUPON REMEDIES FOR PRICE OVERCHARGES -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 402-417, 06.
  2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 823-835, May.
  3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, September.
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
  5. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2002. "A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 217-225, August.
  6. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
  7. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  8. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1999. "On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, January.
  9. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1998. "Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 141-57, January.
  10. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
  11. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1997. "Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 663-77, June.
  12. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1996. "Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 269-280, Summer.
  13. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1993. "Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 239-257, September.
  14. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-48, April.
  15. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1991. "A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 291-306, December.
  16. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
  17. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1991. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 618-21, June.
  18. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
  19. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1988. "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-116, June.
  20. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-64, January.
  21. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1987. "Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 27-46, Spring.
  22. Mitchell Polinsky, A., 1987. "Optimal liability when the injurer's information about the victim's loss is imperfect," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 139-147, December.
  23. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June.
  24. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
  25. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Shavell, Steven, 1982. "Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 385-394, December.
  26. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1980. "On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 233-46, April.
  27. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1980. "Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(2), pages 363-67, May.
  28. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 1980. "The efficiency of paying compensation in the Pigovian solution to externality problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 142-148, June.
  29. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1979. "The Demand for Housing: An Empirical Postscript," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 521-23, March.
  30. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Ellwood, David T, 1979. "An Empirical Reconciliation of Micro and Grouped Estimates of the Demand for Housing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 61(2), pages 199-205, May.
  31. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(1), pages 75-83, February.
  32. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
  33. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1978. "Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area : A reply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 111-112, February.
  34. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1978. "Economics and Law: Discussion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 435-36, May.
  35. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1978. "The long-run effects of a residential property tax and local public services," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 241-262, April.
  36. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1977. "The Demand for Housing: A Study in Specification and Grouping," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 447-61, March.
  37. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Shavell, Steven, 1976. "Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 119-129.
  38. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1975. "The Air Pollution and Property Value Debate," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 57(1), pages 100-104, February.
  39. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1972. "Probabilistic Compensation Criteria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 86(3), pages 407-25, August.
  1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "Preface," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
  2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
11 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1999-02-15
  2. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (6) 2004-01-12 2004-09-30 2005-04-03 2005-12-01 2007-01-02 2012-12-15. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 1999-02-15 2003-12-14 2004-01-12 2012-12-15. Author is listed
  4. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (3) 1999-03-08 2005-12-01 2007-01-02. Author is listed
  5. NEP-REG: Regulation (3) 2005-12-01 2007-01-02 2012-12-15. Author is listed
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