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Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation

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  • Polinsky, A Mitchell

Abstract

Thi spaper is concerned with the risk-allocation effects of alternative types of contracts used to set the price of a good tobe delivered in the future. Under a fixed price contract, the price is specified in advance. Under a spot price contract, the price is the price prevailing in the spot market at the time of delivery.These contract forms are examined in the context of a market in which sellers have uncertain production costs and buyers have uncertain valuations. The paper derives and interprets a general condition determining which contract form would be preferred when the seller and/or the buyer is risk averse. In addition, an example is provided in which a spot price contract with a floor price is superior both to a "pure" spot price contract and a fixed price contract.
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Suggested Citation

  • Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1987. "Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 27-46, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:1:p:27-46
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    Cited by:

    1. Gine,Xavier & Jacoby,Hanan G. & Gine,Xavier & Jacoby,Hanan G., 2016. "Markets, contracts, and uncertainty in a groundwater economy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7694, The World Bank.
    2. Esipov Victor & Menkhaus Dale J. & Yakunina Alla, 1999. "Experimental Study of Forward and Spot Markets: Contract Failure as a Contributing Factor of Vertical Integration," EERC Working Paper Series 99-02e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. João Teixeira, 2014. "Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 327-356, February.
    4. Joel G. Maxcy, 2004. "Contract Length as Risk Management When Labor is not Homogeneous," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 18(2), pages 177-189, June.
    5. Triantis, Alexander J & Triantis, George G, 1998. "Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 163-207, April.
    6. Luong, Phat V. & Xu, Xiaowei, 2020. "Pass-through of commodity price shocks in distribution channels with risk-averse agents," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).

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