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Experimental Study of Forward and Spot Markets: Contract Failure as a Contributing Factor of Vertical Integration

Author

Listed:
  • Esipov Victor
  • Menkhaus Dale J.

    ()

  • Yakunina Alla

    ()

Abstract

A probability of a partner not fulfilling his forward contract obligations (contract failure) increases in a transition economy. This project investigates the process of price and quantity discovery in a laboratory setting when there is (1) an endogenous choice between forward and spot market institutions and vertical integration; and (2) a certain probability of forward contract failure. The results suggest that in some cases a contract failure creates incentives to integration. To develop a system, which efficiently allocates resources, the state policy should be oriented toward strengthening the legal system and developing of the spot market, which may act like an insurance mechanism for the failed forward trades

Suggested Citation

  • Esipov Victor & Menkhaus Dale J. & Yakunina Alla, 1999. "Experimental Study of Forward and Spot Markets: Contract Failure as a Contributing Factor of Vertical Integration," EERC Working Paper Series 99-02e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:99-02e
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drabenstott, Mark, 1994. "Industrialization: Steady Current or Tidal Wave?," Choices, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 9(4).
    2. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 322-322.
    3. Thomas L. Sporleder, 1992. "Managerial Economics of Vertically Coordinated Agricultural Firms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1226-1231.
    4. Davis, Douglas D. & Harrison, Glenn W. & Williams, Arlington W., 1993. "Convergence to nonstationary competitive equilibria : An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 305-326, December.
    5. Leland, Hayne E, 1972. "Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291, June.
    6. Williams, Arlington W & Smith, Vernon L, 1984. "Cyclical Double-Auction Markets with and without Speculators," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-33, January.
    7. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1987. "Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 27-46, Spring.
    8. Ward, Clement E., 1981. "Short-Period Pricing Models For Fed Cattle And Impacts Of Wholesale Carcass Beef And Live Cattle Futures Market Prices," Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 13(01), July.
    9. Ward, Clement E., 1981. "Short-Period Pricing Models for Fed Cattle and Impacts of Wholesale Carcass Beef and Live Cattle Futures Market Prices," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(01), pages 125-132, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    forward contract; spot market; vertical integration; contract failure; experiment.;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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