Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
This paper examines how the optimal Pigouvian tax should be adjusted to reflect administrative costs. Several cases are examined, depending on whether the administrative costs are fixed per firm taxed or are a function of the amount of tax collected, and on whether such costs are borne by the government or by the taxed firm. In some cases, the presence of administrative costs increases the optimal tax above the external cost, while in other cases it leads to a decrease in the tax.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1981|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven. "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs." Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 1982) , pp. 385-394.|
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- Heller, Walter P & Shell, Karl, 1974. "On Optimal Taxation with Costly Administration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(2), pages 338-45, May.
- Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1979. "A Note on Optimal Taxation and Administrative Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(3), pages 475-80, June.
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