IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/enreec/v8y1996i2p183-204.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Chung-Huang Huang

Abstract

This paper explicitly defines enforcement quality and develops a model by incorporating enforcement quality and the firm's avoidance behavior. The results indicate that the effectiveness of environmental regulations is likely to depend upon the level of enforcement quality, as well as upon the nature of the firm's avoidance behavior. Policy instruments may become incompatible under certain circumstances. Enforcement quality should be properly targeted to enhance functional harmonization between instruments. The condition under which emission tax is more effective under imperfect enforcement than under complete enforcement is also identified. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Chung-Huang Huang, 1996. "Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 183-204, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:8:y:1996:i:2:p:183-204
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00357363
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00357363
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shaffer, Sherrill, 1990. "Regulatory Compliance with Nonlinear Penalties," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 99-103, March.
    2. Dewees, Donald N, 1983. "Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(1), pages 53-71, January.
    3. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    4. Linder, Stephen H. & McBride, Mark E., 1984. "Enforcement costs and regulatory reform: The agency and firm response," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 327-346, December.
    5. Jeremy Greenwood & R. Preston McAfee, 1991. "Externalities and Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 103-121.
    6. Downing, Paul B. & Watson, William Jr., 1974. "The economics of enforcing air pollution controls," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 219-236, November.
    7. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Shavell, Steven, 1982. "Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 385-394, December.
    8. Kenneth L. Wertz, 1974. "Short-run Effects of an Increased Effluent Charge in a Competitive Market," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 7(4), pages 676-682, November.
    9. Zuckerman, Stephen & Hadley, Jack & Iezzoni, Lisa, 1994. "Measuring hospital efficiency with frontier cost functions," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 255-280, October.
    10. Schmidt, Peter & Knox Lovell, C. A., 1979. "Estimating technical and allocative inefficiency relative to stochastic production and cost frontiers," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 343-366, February.
    11. Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
    12. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, March.
    13. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
    14. Kambhu, John, 1990. "Direct controls and incentives systems of regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 72-85, March.
    15. Kopp, Raymond J. & Diewert, W. Erwin, 1982. "The decomposition of frontier cost function deviations into measures of technical and allocative efficiency," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 319-331, August.
    16. Jones, Carol Adaire & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "The social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-72, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:8:y:1996:i:2:p:183-204. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.