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Remedies For Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss Of Coupons And Discounts

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  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell
  • Rubinfeld, Daniel L.

Abstract

This article evaluates two different remedies for consumers who have been injured by a price overcharge on the sale of a good. Under a coupon remedy, injured consumers are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated, that is, below the competitive price. Under a discount remedy, any consumer, without proof of injury, may purchase the good for a limited period of time at a price that is set below the competitive price. Both remedies generally cause consumers to buy an excessive amount of the good during the remedy period. Under the coupon remedy only a subset of consumers are affected in this way (those holding a relatively high number of coupons), while under the discount remedy all consumers are affected. We show nonetheless that the resulting deadweight loss could be lower under the discount remedy. We also consider how the deadweight loss changes when the length of the remedy period is increased.

Suggested Citation

  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2003. "Remedies For Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss Of Coupons And Discounts," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1gs1g2g2, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt1gs1g2g2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Borenstein, Severin, 1996. "Settling for Coupons: Discount Contracts as Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 379-404, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies," NBER Working Papers 11227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    14. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2003. "Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt92m0w4px, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.

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