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Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model


  • Alexander Smajgl

    () (CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems)


Institutional arrangements are key drivers of the use of common-pool resources (CPR). The analysis of existing arrangements requires a framework that allows research to describe a case study systematically and diagnose the institutional setting. Based on a sound understanding of current institutions the question of what effects alternate arrangements would have becomes evident. This step requires a predictive model, which can either be qualitative or, preferably, analyses an empirical case quantitatively. A major conceptual challenge of a quantitative model is the evolution of rules, which define the boundaries for the agents to choose strategies. This paper develops the conceptual foundations for such a modelling approach and an agent-based model for the analysis of institutional arrangements in a CPR setting.

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  • Alexander Smajgl, 2007. "Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage:, vol. 5(2), pages 56-80.
  • Handle: RePEc:zna:indecs:v:5:y:2007:i:2:p:56-80

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    multi-agent simulation; agent-based modelling; institutional arrangements; common-pool resources;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q19 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Other


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