Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model
Institutional arrangements are key drivers of the use of common-pool resources (CPR). The analysis of existing arrangements requires a framework that allows research to describe a case study systematically and diagnose the institutional setting. Based on a sound understanding of current institutions the question of what effects alternate arrangements would have becomes evident. This step requires a predictive model, which can either be qualitative or, preferably, analyses an empirical case quantitatively. A major conceptual challenge of a quantitative model is the evolution of rules, which define the boundaries for the agents to choose strategies. This paper develops the conceptual foundations for such a modelling approach and an agent-based model for the analysis of institutional arrangements in a CPR setting.
Volume (Year): 5 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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