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Can you guess the game you are playing?

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  • Oechssler, Jorg
  • Schipper, Burkhard

Abstract

Recently there has been much theoretical and experimental work on learning in games. However, learning usually means "learning about the strategic behavior of opponents" rather than "learning about the game" as such. In contrast, here we report on an experiment designed to test whether players learn a) the relevant features of the payoff structure of a 2x2 game (e.g. the best reply structure) and b) whether they play according to equilibrium predictions regardless of how question a) is being answered. Question a) is being tested by asking subjects to guess the payoff structure of their opponents in a repeated encounter and rewarding subjects for correct answers.
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  • Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2003. "Can you guess the game you are playing?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 137-152, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:137-152
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    Cited by:

    1. H Peyton Young & H.H. Nax & M.N. Burton-Chellew & S.A. Westor, 2013. "Learning in a Black Box: Trial-and-Error in Voluntary Contribuitons Games," Economics Series Working Papers 653, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    3. Heinrich H. Nax & Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew & Stuart A. West & H. Peyton Young, 2013. "Learning in a Black Box," Working Papers hal-00817201, HAL.
    4. David Danz & Dietmar Fehr & Dorothea Kübler, 2012. "Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 622-640, December.
    5. Scroggin, Steven, 2003. "Bounded Rationality in Randomization," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1974b8tz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    6. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2012. "An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2220-2259.
    7. Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
    9. Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Andreas Nicklisch, 2011. "Learning strategic environments: an experimental study of strategy formation and transfer," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 539-558, October.
    11. GEORGANTZIS, Nikolaos & moner-colonques, Rafael & ORTS, Vicente & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, José J., 2012. "Theoretical and experimental insights on firms’ internationalization decisions under uncertainty," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2012041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    12. Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Perceiving strategic environments: An experimental study of learning under minimal information," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    13. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Robalino, Nikolaus & Robson, Arthur J., 2017. "Applying “theory of mind”: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 209-226.
    14. Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex, 2012. "Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 102-119.
    15. Erik O. Kimbrough & Nikolaus Robalino & Arthur J. Robson, 2013. "The Evolution of 'Theory of Mind': Theory and Experiments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1908, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & Akiyama, Eizo, 2009. "Learning games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1739-1756, October.
    17. Nick Feltovich & Sobei H. Oda, 2014. "Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 260-277, August.
    18. Alexander Smajgl, 2007. "Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu, vol. 5(2), pages 56-80.
    19. Alexander Smajgl, 2004. "Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 178, Society for Computational Economics.
    20. Heinrich H. Nax & Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew & Stuart A. West & H. Peyton Young, 2013. "Learning in a Black Box," PSE Working Papers hal-00817201, HAL.
    21. Anke Gerber, "undated". "Learning in and about Games," IEW - Working Papers 234, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    22. Andreas Nicklisch, 2004. "Perceiving strategic environments -An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer-," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-26, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    23. Hiroyuki Sakakibara & Kanae Kimura, 2013. "Experimental Study on Negotiation Process in Participatory Decision Making Process in a Community," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 71-84, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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